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REVOLUTION IN INDIA

By FRANCES CUNTER

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Hatred does not cease by hatred
at any time; hatred ceases by love
—this is an old rule. BUDDHA


What we are when motionless
is the question.

ANTOINE DE SAINT EXUPÉRY

CENTRAL BOOK DEPOT

ALLAHABAD

Published in India
by arrangement
1946



2206

Cover Design--Frederick Jahnel

Printed by P. C. Ray at Sri Gouranga Press, 5, Chintamani Das
Lane, Calcutta and published by K. L. Bhargava,
Central Book Depot, Allahabad.

TO JOHN GUNTHER

“forsan et haec olim meminisse juvabit”

Preface with Acknowledgments

Irresistibly propelled by the global forces of World War II, India is rapidly emerging from the political purdah in which British imperial foreign policy has for many decades confined her. Signalling this emergence, several excellent books on Indian history, economics, statistics, etc., have recently appeared. The reason for being of this small additional book is its intentional stress on the psychological aspect of the Anglo-Indian conflict, which seems to the writer to have become the crux of the situation.

The line taken in this book is pro-Free India, which does not mean anti-English. On the contrary, I should like to make it quite clear at the outset that I am, in my fashion, passionately pro-English. Like most Americans, I am in favour of a tenable understanding with England and the whole Commonwealth to regularize our relations which since 1897 have been healthfully intimate, but too often clandestine. However, a basic condition of this understanding is the stable foundation of a free India as a cornerstone of a free Asia.

For a rounded picture of the Indian situation, the following books are recommended: *Speeches on India*, by Winston Churchill, for the Tory English line, *The Unity of India*, by Jawaharlal Nehru of India, *India Without Fable* by Kate Mitchell, American, and *Subject India* by H. N. Brailsford, English Liberal. If there is time for only one book, read the last.

The loosely linked articles and speeches in the present book, composed since 1940, are regrettably not yet sufficiently dated; the sooner they are, the sooner will their purpose have been achieved. Some of the material appeared in *Common Sense*, to which thanks are due for

permission to reprint. I am also greatly indebted to the John Day Company for permission to quote from Nehru's *Unity of India* and *Toward Freedom*, and Gandhi's *My Appeal to the British*, to Kitabistan, Allahabad, publishers of Nehru's *China, India and the War* and *Report of the All India National Planning Committee*, as well as to Harcourt, Brace & Company, publishers of T. S. Eliot's *The Idea of a Christian Society*, Duell, Sloane and Pearce, publishers of Archibald MacLeish's *The Irresponsibles*, and Reynal and Hitchcock, publishers of Antoine de Saint Exupéry's *Flight to Arras*.

Acknowledgments are gratefully made to my friends on the staffs of the British Information Services and the Research Bureau of the India League of America for their helpful courtesies in checking facts, to Selden Rodman of *Common Sense* for editorial surgery, to Anna Curtis and Helene Scheu of the Island Press for aid in proof-reading and publishing, and to John Gunther and John Gunther Jr. for their generous support and encouragement. Responsibility for opinions expressed remain of course the writer's own white woman's burden.

F. G.

February 1944.

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CHAPTER ONE

English Will to Rule vs. Indian Will to Freedom

"We intend to remain the effective rulers of India for a long and indefinite period . . . Our right and our power to restrict Indian constitutional liberties are unchallengeable . . . I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire . . . We mean to hold our own."

Winston Churchill.

"British imperialism will have to be liquidated and India recognized as an independent country . . . India will never accept any position in the Empire by whatever name it may be called . . . We want independence and not dominion or any other status . . . The goal of India is a united, free, democratic country, closely associated in a world federation with other free countries."

Jawaharlal Nehru.

*"But there is neither East nor West, border nor breed nor birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, though they
come from the ends of the earth."*

Rudyard Kipling.

What is taking place in India today is a gigantic struggle of heroic proportions between two powerful wills—the English will to rule versus the Indian will to freedom.

This struggle, already begun in World War I, has been accelerated and acerbated by World War II. On both sides, English no less than Indian, the situation has gone far beyond calculating reason. Economically, India might conceivably gain by remaining in the Empire as a Dominion—but she would rather be free and starve. Financially, England would certainly gain by trading with a free India, but she would rather keep India as the brightest jewel of the Imperial Crown—even at the risk of having to hock the Crown.

Now why is this so? It may be that in nations, no less than in individuals, balked wills and frustrated wills turn into obsessions. England is frustrating India's will to freedom—and India has developed an obsession to be free. India is balking England's will to rule—and England has developed an obsession to continue her rule. Friends of England and India sought long and hard for a working compromise at least for the duration. But in the driving stresses of this war, which have exposed political nerves to the raw and stripped motives to the bare bone, compromise became in fact impossible.

In 1940, Nehru offered the British complete military co-operation on condition of Indian freedom. England turned it down: it meant the end of English rule. In 1942, the Cripps plan offered India certain concessions. India turned it down: it failed to give them freedom. By yielding to each other, both sides had much to gain. But the compulsion to rule on the one side, and to be free on the other, were both too strong to admit of half-way measures.

The personal friendship between Nehru and Cripps bridged much of the gap between east and west. Yet in the ultimate crisis, they had to break. Despite their personal desire for conciliation, Cripps in the end had to stand by Churchill and English policy, just as Nehru had

to stand by Gandhi and Indian policy. Their broken friendship is a symbol of the present dilemma.

A national compulsion, like a personal one, is the result of many long-past actions and reactions. India under English rule has for generations been Wasteland. Today it is exploding, not with a whimper, but with a bang. It is a loud bang. Everybody can hear it—except England. (Leitmotiv of this book.) She is deafened and blinded by her obsession to rule. What is the nature of this obsession?

Mission

Like most Americans, I used to think that all this Kipling talk about the white man's burden and the Englishman's mission was just kidding, just hooy, or just hypocrisy. But it isn't. It is deadly earnest. Most Englishmen honestly believe that God chose them to bear the white man's burden of ruling other people, and that this God-imposed mission is their sacred responsibility and their destiny, which they must fulfil. The whole life of the ruling class of England is dedicated to and disciplined by the holy grail of this mission, from the cradle through Eton to the grave.

It is easy to deal with hypocrisy. But this fervid faith is dangerous. What caused it? A medley of entangled motives. Beginning as adventure, the conquest of foreign lands became an economic habit, then a necessity; easy wealth led to lust for more wealth, to lust for power, to excess, to crime; conscience and religion intervened, and led to self-reproach; guilt became rationalized into duty, duty became mission, and mission became fate. Something of all this metamorphosed into Responsibility to the Empire and the Crown, abstractions more powerful than gold or life.

Today the imperial Englishman says with sincere con-

trition, "Yes, we know we didn't do very well by you before, but now we're going to do better—we're going to do wonderful things for you!" He really wants to atone. The subject peoples reply, "Never mind. We don't want you to do anything for us. We want to do things for ourselves. We forgive you for the past. Forget it. Just let us alone for the future." But the Englishman can't do that: he feels compelled to atone—and to rule.

The moralistic redresses are harder to bear than the original sins. Paradoxically, England's greatest crime against India lies less in the excesses of the conquest than in the conscience-stricken repentance that followed them: *it lies precisely in her mission of doing things for India, and so preventing Indians from doing things for themselves*, in denying them experience, and the opportunity for growth and development that can only come from experience, especially in the complex profession of government.

Ways and means need urgently to be found to disentangle the English from the myth of their self-anointed mission, to absolve them from the need of expiation, and to persuade them to assume normal relations with India.

More Mission

What is the British outlook for India in the fifth year of the Second World War for Democracy and Freedom? It remains British.

Brilliant Quintin Hogg, son of Lord Hailsham, spokesman of the Young Tories now emerging as the dominant factor in British political leadership, tells us (in "British Policy, a Conservative Forecast," *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. '43) that the war has given Britain "*a renewed belief in our power to master difficulties . . . a new sense of political mission. . . .*"

"Mission" is ominous, especially when followed by this line: "Can we live without our African *possessions*? Can we develop our African *possessions* without *American capital*? Can American trade function in Africa and Asia without *British political assistance*?" The implied answers are clearly "No." The problem of India is as usual not even mentioned, but is presumably included in this statement of policy: "The British Colonial Empire will continue to develop toward self-government, but during this process will be regarded more as the *possession* of the Commonwealth, and less as that of the United Kingdom." (Italics inserted.)

So to the Young Tories, as to the old, Asia and Africa are still "possessions." Plus ça change, plus ça reste. . . . Previously, possessions of the *Hoggs* of England; now, of the *Hoggs* of the Empire. . . . Have the United Nations fought World War II for this?

Rulers and Writers

It is true that all the great English liberals favor Indian freedom—as they have done for a century. Unfortunately, these men do not make English policy. They merely write fine English prose. There are two kinds of Englishman: those that write, and those that rule. For generations, the English writers have been urging freedom for India. Burke, Bright, Cobden, Hobson, and Brailsford have said things about English rule in India that no American (not even Mrs. Gunther), would dare to print today. *But the English rulers keep right on ruling.*

Problem: to translate the prose of the English writers into the policy of the English rulers.

Political Scorched Earth

Inside India, what indications are there of an actual solution? Never have English-Indian relations been so

deadlocked. The new Viceroy, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell, is Britain's greatest military strategist. His appointment puts teeth into Mr. Churchill's bull-dogged determination to hold his own in India. Lord Wavell has taken office in an atmosphere made rank by frustration, suppressed fury, and unprecedented famine. His first public act was, significantly, calling up the Indian Army to deal with the famine situation. Responsible democratic Indian leaders have been imprisoned, their political authority weakened and discredited ; many right and left extremist groups, advocating partition or civil war, have been skyrocketed into prominence. The British government of India, aiding and abetting Indian disruption, has retained sole power. Consciously or unconsciously, it is carrying out a *political scorched earth policy* : if we must go, we will leave only confusion and disaster behind us.

U.S.A. in India

The war drew America into India. For the first time in history, at *British request*, American troops were called in, and so were American Lend-Lease, American industrial engineers, American capital. But American political influence was strictly left out. President Roosevelt sent two personal envoys to India. Col. Johnson's viewpoint was totally disregarded, Ambassador Philips' request to see imprisoned Gandhi was flatly rejected.

When American OWI courageously flung this advertisement of American goodwill across India : "In Asia, as in Europe, the Expeditionary Forces of the U.S.A. have come to fight side by side for liberty with those whose freedom is in danger. America fights for freedom," British comment in the *Sunday Dispatch* was : "The British Government's view appears to be that the political position in India makes such a campaign inadvisable."

Democratic Americans believe that there are two sides to every question, but they can't both be equally right. In the monumental struggle between the Indian will to be free and the British will to rule, American sympathy is naturally with India against England—for England's sake as much as for India's.

This is not a mere matter of saving England's face. England has gone through history losing her face, picking it up out of the muck, brushing it off on her sleeve, and blandly putting it on again. This is a matter of saving England's position as the matrix of the British Commonwealth. Clutching India, England stands to lose much or all. Freeing India, England may yet free herself, and preserve the Commonwealth, one of the most basic, valuable, and admirable political structures of our time.

The people of America, like those of Britain, the Commonwealth, Russia, China, and all the other United Nations, are sound on India. We want India to be as free as ourselves, as free as any nation can be in the new interdependent world. The government of the United States is also sound on India. Statements made by President Roosevelt, Vice-President Wallace, and other officials, by Sumner Welles, and Wendell Wilkie, have all—without impugning the motives of an ally—repudiated imperialism.

We have American aims in this war. Sumner Welles has stated them: "No nation has the inherent and unlimited right to govern subject peoples." And Achibald MacLeish has stated them: "What is at stake in this war is a great principle, the principle won in the peoples' revolutions of the past 150 years, the principle that people can govern themselves, and of right should. . . . But words alone will not do what must be done. There must be action also. And the acts must accord with the words. . . ."

We know that the so-called "insoluble" problems of

India could be solved overnight—*by people who wanted to solve them*. But British strategy, conscious or unconscious, is to gag, imprison, discredit, and render politically impotent all Indian patriots who believe in unity, democracy, tolerance, freedom; and to encourage, exhibit, subsidize and publicize those Indians who believe in disunity, civil war, intolerance, and autocracy. Simply by reversing the process, half the battle of Indian freedom with stability could be won.

Will American participation in post-war reconstruction be used to support Indian freedom—or will it be manipulated to support British “mastery” of India? Will India win back responsibility for her own destiny? Or is Nehru of India to remain the possession of Young Tory Q. Hogg, Esq.?

Beneath this massive tug of wills, the Indian revolution goes inexorably on.

CHAPTER TWO

Revolution in India

"National movements everywhere begin moderately, and inevitably become more extreme A demand for freedom suppressed, has to be met later with compound interest."

Jawaharlal Nehru in *The Unity of India*.

State of Revolution

The major event of World War I was the Russian Revolution. We see that clearly now, although we did not see it then, when it was considered merely a military nuisance and a temporary incident. We did everything we could to hamstring it. Despite all our conspiracies, however, Russia managed to survive and eventually lived to save England and the United States—us—from destruction in World War II. What earthly good did our hamstringing the Russian Revolution do anybody? None whatever. On the contrary, our counter-revolutionary interventions forced a potentially democratic movement into authoritarian channels.

The major event of World War II is the Indian Revolution. It may not seem so at the moment, but it will emerge in its true stature in the perspective of time, when incidents like the Pacific Islands victories, now making the headlines, will recede into the forgotten footnotes to history. What are we, the United Nations, doing about the Indian Revolution? We are doing everything possible to hamstring, to frustrate, to spike, to cripple, to undermine, and

ultimately to destroy it. What earthly good will that do? None whatever. On the contrary, our hindrance may drive India from revolutionary democracy to fascist desperation.

A state of revolution is a state of political nature in which a people feels itself in the throes of delivering an idea to the world ; like the time of delivery, it cannot be put off to a more convenient or a less embarrassing moment : when it comes, it comes, and must take its course. In this emergency, either one of two methods may be adopted : the revolution may be helped, or the revolution may be hindered ; it cannot be stopped.

International behavior, even in normal times, is on a notoriously low level, but the traditional behavior of nations toward a fellow nation in the throes of revolution is the dregs of that. It consists in taking every possible unfair advantage of the situation. A revolutionary country is extremely vulnerable : psychologically, it is high-strung, exalted, its temperature is high ; within its own borders exist the dead-weight forces of the old order ; it bears wounds that only the revolution itself in the course of its own time can heal. To a nation in this condition, international usage has countenanced the right of other nations to hit exclusively below the belt, by methods ranging from subsidized counter-revolutionary disruption to actual frontal attack.

Take all the great revolutions of the past 300 years, and the spectacle repeats itself with a terrifying monotony. The English Cromwellian Revolution of the 17th century was no sooner under way than the powers of Europe began that series of conspiracies in Ireland and Scotland which necessarily led to the bloodiest civil wars and reprisals in the history of the British Isles ; and only the good old Channel saved England from actual invasion. When the French Revolution broke out in the following century, England retaliated in kind, assisted by all Europe,

especially Russia. It should not be forgotten that France struggled desperately to preserve the democracy of her revolution for ten long years, from 1789 to 1799, before the counter-revolutionary foreign invasion obliged her to accept Napoleon and the 18th Brumaire. So, too, the Russian Revolution of our own day was driven by the external pressure of foreign invaders (British, French, Polish, Czech and American) to dictatorial measures of repression that were not part of the original revolutionary plans. Similarly, the revolution of the German Weimar Republic found itself facing the pre-arranged enmity of all its neighbors before it even got started, and thus it became monsterized into the revolution of the Hitler Reich.

A nation in a condition of revolution demands special treatment from the world, the essence of which is protection from foreign counter-revolutionary intervention.

A national revolution of 390 million people, living in a continental area that is also a pivotal war zone, involves and affects everybody on earth, including us. What are we going to do about it? What is the nature of the Indian Revolution? Are we for it—or against it?

There are three aspects to the Indian problem:

1. The problem of the English in India.
2. The problem of the Indians in India.
3. The problem of the United Nations in India.

The problem of the English in India is the really hard nut to crack. This problem is both psychological and economic.

The English in India

In the historic case of India versus England, England has taken an extraordinary position. The accused in the

case, she has at one and the same time appointed herself sole judge, jury, court of appeals, and supreme court.

The English presentation of the story of India is one of the strangest phantasmagoria in all history. It is fish, flesh and—foul. We cannot here go into the details of the political psycho-pathology of the long and extraordinary "connexion," a sort of international crime passionnel between England and India, in which not merely gold on an incalculably grand scale has been involved, but also power and pride, violence, shame, compulsion and much concealed bloodshed. Rationalizing this liaison, England has created a highly complicated fantasy, the most dangerous feature of which is that many Englishmen honestly believe it. There are thus two versions of the story of India, the one presented by the English government, or the Fantastic Fictions, and the other observable by any detached reporter, or the Approximate Facts. Let us try to distinguish between them :

The Fictions : that India speaks hundreds of different languages ; that it is composed of barbarous, primitive people who have always been invaded and conquered ; that India was an economic nonentity before the English came and established their benevolent trusteeship over India at great self-sacrifice ; that before England so generously took on the white man's burden, India was in a state of political barbarism, never having heard of freedom or democracy until they read about them second-hand in English books ; that having learned all about democracy from England, India now has so many different political parties ready to fly at each other's throats that, should England ever lay down its great burden of ruling India, India would immediately fall into civil war and chaos ; and that thereupon India would at once be invaded, conquered, and utterly destroyed by the enemy—(this enemy changes with England's own political complexion : once

France, then China, then Russia—remember the Russian Bear licking his lustful chops across the Khyber Pass in the dear dead days of only yesteryear?); that India has dozens of warring, primitive, pagan religions, and that the Hindu-Muslim problem in particular can never be solved.

The Facts: India, which is as big as all Europe minus Russia, speaks no more languages than any other territory of similar size and population: there are eleven languages and a common speech in Hindi-Urdu or Hindustani—(the tiny Philippines alone have eight languages and 87 dialects); India is composed of a highly civilized people who have not been invaded and conquered any more frequently on the average than other peoples in three thousand years of recorded history; India had a highly developed economy eminently suited to her geographic needs; there is a historical tradition of freedom and democracy at least two millennia old in India that has survived and flourished during all invasions, including the English*; in ratio to its population, there are comparatively few religions in India, the religious level is remarkably high and tolerant, and the Hindu-Muslim problem (of which more, later) is an artificial English irritant.

According to the English fiction, there is a double standard of democracy, that which applies in England and other conveniently located countries, and that which

* As an example of how close and intimate this tradition has been in Indian life, here are some quotations from the 1200 year old Indian marriage ritual—note its wide social implications as compared to the narrowly personal tone of our own “With all my worldly goods I thee endow:” “We resolve to dedicate our lives in the service of that Light which leads humanity onward . . . If there are any people in the four quarters of the earth who venture to deprive us of our freedom, mark! Here we are, sword in hand, prepared to resist them to the last. We pray for the spreading light of freedom; may it envelop us on all sides! . . . May our projects be common and common the Assembly of our people; may our people be of like mind and purpose.”

applies in India. When a Scottish marquis rules India with power of absolute veto, that's democracy ; but should the major political party of India rule India, that, say the English, would be dictatorship. (In April 1942 Sir Stafford Cripps actually said that a responsible Indian national cabinet government "would in fact constitute an absolute dictatorship of the majority.") In England people vote as Englishmen and do not vote as Catholics or Presbyterians ; but in India, Indians may not vote as Indians, only as Muslims or Christians, etc. In England, the peerage has renounced its feudal rights ; but in India feudal rights are "guaranteed" to Indian princes as a British "obligation." In England, the freedom of the press is a sacred right ; but in India the press may be suspended, muzzled, heavily fined and prohibited at all times. (Today there are about two hundred Indian newspapers that may not be mailed abroad. No American has ever received a single copy of the newspaper whose leading editorials Nehru has been writing for about five years). The self-determination of peoples, great and small, is England's battle cry ; it applies everywhere—except in India. Even Abyssinia has been declared as "now fit to be free"—but not India.

Cripps Slips

It was because of this double standard of democracy that the Cripps mission broke down. The Indian Congress had the temerity to demand single standard democracy. They were willing, to save English face, to retain the Viceroy as a constitutional figurehead, and willingly conceded to General Wavell the same powers in India that Australia had conceded to General MacArthur, but they insisted on an Indian Cabinet with full powers and effective democratic responsibility. But in the Cripps plan, ultimate control remained fixed where for decades it has

been fixed in India: in the single person of the Viceroy. I quote from the authoritative book, "The Cripps Mission," by Professor Coupland, a member of Sir Stafford's staff: "The Viceroy *alone* could determine the composition of a Council with which he would have to work . . . (He) is specifically entitled by the Act (of 1935) to dissent from the *majority* opinion of his Council."

This means, in plain American, that the Viceroy retains his power personally to appoint a Council of yes-men—well, he certainly wouldn't go out of his way to appoint a Council of no-men, would he?—but even if the yes-men should ever unforeseeably presume to say no, the Viceroy could simply reply, "Dismissed, boys!" and dictate his own decrees. Now the Viceroy is always an estimable gentleman who would do his utmost to be fair as Viceroy under the Act of 1935. But that Act, an English document, has nothing whatever to do with democracy in India. Of the Viceroy's hand-picked Council of fifteen, only four members are British, but these four are in control of everything of any importance: the so-called "reserved" subjects, War, Finance, War Transport, and the Home Department, this last being a characteristic English euphuism for the English Gestapo in India.

The Cripps plan further offers to the 584 autocratic Indian Princes and to all Indians of the Muslim faith, the unprecedented political right (termed "the right of non-accession") of not acceding to, or not joining, or seceding from, the Indian National State—even before it is constituted!

It should be noted that although the Cripps plan grants the right of non-accession to a national Indian government, the English have never granted either to the Princes or the Muslims the right of non-accession to their own government in India. That is, they are very sympathetic to Mr. Jinnah's notion of a separate, independent

Pakistan as an All-Indian headache ; but Pakistan free from the British Raj—? Oh, no, Jinnah, no, Jinnah, no !*

Briefly, the Congress rejected the Cripps plan for two reasons : first, because the Viceroy, despite the changes in the personnel of his Council, still retained absolute power in his own hands, responsible to no one in India ; and secondly, because the plan, by introducing the right of non-accession to a future Indian government, presented an invitation, in fact a command, to disunity, anarchy and civil war.

An analogous situation would be this : Japan conquers the United States, and about 150 years later very generously grants us a Constitution dictated in Tokyo, under which any State in the Union has the right to secede if it feels like it, and under which Americans have nothing to say about their own army, navy, air force, money, business, trade relations, churches, wars, peace treaties, or their relations with their neighbors ; and in the White House would sit the representative of the King Emperor, who could always smile, "So sorry—no !"

As Professor Coupland puts it : "The real question was, then : who was to have the last word, the Viceroy or the majority of the Indian party leaders. In all the circumstances, the British government's answer was never in doubt." A little doubt here might have been a good thing.

Describing a press conference of Sir Stafford's in detail, Coupland comments : "The historians of tomorrow may well date the declaration of Indian independence on March 29, 1942." One can only hope that the historians

* The Statute of Westminster, which binds the separate parts of the Empire together under the Crown, contains no clause on the right of secession, although the dominions, especially South Africa, fought long and hard to insert one. The right of session is, however, supposed to be implied, in so far as it is not explicitly denied. A Dominions Minister once said that a dominion had as much right to secede as a man had to cut his own throat.

of tomorrow will be less behind the times than Professor Coupland. India dated its own Declaration of Independence on the 26th of January, 1930. Can Professor Coupland be unaware of this historic date?

Ants in Our Pants

This may seem a minor point, but it is symptomatic of a general attitude of English unawareness to the realities of the non-English world. The most awesome spectacle in the whole Orient this past decade has been the total English obliviousness to the thoughts and passions and decisions of the people they ruled. Revolutions brewed strongly under their very noses: they smelt nothing; perhaps they were holding Old English lavender to their delicate nostrils.

In 1938 in Malaya outside Singapore, we asked our charming English hosts to tell us a bit about their subversive elements; they laughed: there were no subversive elements in Malaya! The bar of the Raffles Hotel in Singapore that very evening was openly jammed with them. Many foreign correspondents have related stories of British officers who told them that the Japs would not "dare" invade Singapore—the day before it happened. O. D. Gallegher, in his recent "Action in the East," quotes Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, as saying four days before Pearl Harbor: "There are clear indications that Japan does not know which way to turn. Tojo is scratching his head." And about the same time Mr. Churchill himself was wise-cracking: "The Japs are just the Wops of the Pacific." Even now, according to a *Time* correspondent, the English in New Delhi are saying: "You Americans think we are sitting on top of a powder keg. We are not. We are sitting on an ant hill. We may get ants in our pants, but we'll ride it out."

Well, 390 million ants is a lot of ants—especially in one's pants.

As recently as 1931 Winston Churchill could say, "It is alarming and also nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi striding half naked up the steps of the Viceregal palace . . . to parley on equal terms with the representative of the King Emperor." Mr. Churchill was not Prime Minister when he said this, nor, even for a British statesman, was he an irresponsible lad ; he was 57. Mr. Churchill said many other things in this little book, "Speeches on India" which it would be too embarrassing to the cause of the United Nations to reprint now.

However, there is one point he repeatedly stressed that needs airing now. In his words : "The loss of India, however arising, would be final and fatal to us. It could not fail to be part of a process which would reduce us to the scale of a minor power . . . The loss of India would mark and consummate the downfall of the British Empire. The great organism would pass at a stroke out of life . . . From such a catastrophe there could be no recovery . . . If, guided by counsels of madness and cowardice disguised as false benevolence"—(i.e. if India got Dominion status), "you troop home from India . . . you will find famine to greet you on the horizon on your return."

As Prime Minister then, Mr. Churchill must necessarily consider it his constitutional duty to prevent at whatever cost a catastrophe that would consummate the fatal downfall of the Empire entrusted to his care.

The failure of the Cripps mission may therefore be seen to be due less to the unreasonable intransigence of the leaders of Indian democracy than to the ancient imperial convictions fixated in the otherwise volatile mind of the Prime Minister.

Churchill is not alone in feeling that the freedom of India means the end of England. Lord Curzon also said,

"If we lose India, the sun of our Empire will have set " Generations of Englishmen have been reared in this melancholy tradition. It is perhaps unduly pessimistic.

There exists a modern school of economic thought which holds that a free India might mean not the end, but the beginning of England—a new England, a free England, an England freed from the hard facts no less than from the fanciful fictions of the white man's burden.

This brings us to the economic end of the problem of the English in India.

Imperial Plum

Due to their complex relationship, the English almost never, publicly, mention money in connection with India, yet there is such a mundane connection, to the tune of some five billion dollars in Indian investments (one quarter of total British foreign investments), and an astronomical figure in British industries which depend on the Indian market.

This is a perfectly legitimate and serious financial problem: if India became independent, what would happen to these investments, what would happen to these industries? What would happen to Imperial trade?

The whole vast complex organization of imperial trade has been built around India, the richest plum in the imperial economic pudding, her population being about four out of the Empire's five hundred million. If India becomes independent, what happens to this complex economic machine?

What happens to the hundreds of thousands of English holders of Indian bonds? What happens to the thousands of workmen in Lancashire factories?

These are all matters of real concern, about which England could speak out freely and honestly. She need

not keep repeating, like a dull parrot, all this ancient twaddle about the muslims and the princes and the white man's burden. I suppose she does because she is afraid to face it. I don't think she needs to be. She could face it—and solve it—and come out with her colors flying, not bedraggled in the mud as they are now.

It is a difficult job, this economic readjustment and re-interpretation of the relations between a free India and the British Commonwealth—particularly so, because in her conquest of India, England not only destroyed India's natural balanced economy, but in doing so, she also destroyed her own. The effect of the conquest has been mutually detrimental: India became over-agriculturalized, lacking the industries to arm herself: England became over-industrialized, lacking the agriculture to feed herself. By turning India into a raw material country, and buying the raw materials cheap, and by turning herself into a manufacturing country, and selling manufactured goods dear, England made a lot of money easy and quick. What the ultimate consequences have been, we see today, when England must beg food, and India must beg arms, from America.

This economic adjustment is, of course, not a simple matter. But putting Lend-Lease into effect for the United Nations was not such a simple economic matter either—but we had to do it, and we did. This economic adjustment between India and England would be an honourable job, a decent, man-sized, constructive job that would make demands on all the faculties of modern economic men and all the functions of modern economic civilization.

It is clearly a job that calls for a higher calibre of statesmanship than locking Gandhi up in the Aga Khan's bungalow, raiding Nehru's private desk, and beating Indian patriots "legally" under the Emergency Whipping Act.

Among England's main reasons for refusing Indian independence have been, first, fear of economic dislocation at home, especially in the cotton mills of Lancashire, and second, fear that India might go Communist, eliminate English-owned Indian industries, and repudiate the tremendous national debt that has somehow accumulated in the past 150 years under the English trusteeship.

These two fears are certainly not groundless. Lancashire will unquestionably have to adjust itself to a different market, because India has every natural resource to make her textiles at home, instead of having to pay for their importation, on British bottoms, halfway across the globe, at British prices, as for the past 150 years she has been forced to do.

As to communism, the Indian National Congress is no more communist than the British Labor party. Its membership includes all classes from peasants to big industrialists. True, the Economic Program of the Indian Congress has recommended the "state control of key industries and services, mineral resources, railways, waterways, shipping and other means of public transport." But it is becoming increasingly evident throughout the world, democratic no less than totalitarian, that some form of such state control is inevitable everywhere. Repudiation of national debts was not contemplated by Gandhi and Nehru in a peaceful adjustment to Indian independence. (See Nehru's statement on page 140.)

Whether India would feel itself obliged to honor its national debt after a revolution by war is, of course, an entirely different matter. One may assume that Subhas Bose, who is talking about Indian independence over the radio from Japan because he was not allowed to talk about it over the radio from Calcutta or London, would not feel that India was bound to honor the English debt. Bose's attitude would be: "To hell with the English

debt." Bose has a very large following in India, above and underground.

India of the Indians

This brings us to the problem of the Indians in India. Before we examine the Hindu-Muslim problem, and the nature of the Indian Revolution, let me sketch briefly for background the recent record of the Indian Congress party, which is leading the nationalist movement.

1. In 1930, the Congress issued its Declaration of Purna Swaraj or Complete Independence. It has never deviated from the policy of absolute independence. All English talk for and against Dominion Status for India has been waste motion.

2. In 1931, the Congress passed the Karachi Resolution of Fundamental Rights and Duties. (See Appendix, page 131.) This is a historic document of great importance, decades in advance of its time. It guarantees absolute freedom of religion to all citizens as well as freedom of speech, assembly and press, and equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of religion, caste or sex. It provides likewise for the state ownership or control of national industries and resources.

3. In 1931, in the same Karachi Resolution, the Congress also demanded that "The State shall provide for military training of citizens so as to organize a means of national defense apart from the regular military force."

4. At the same time—beginning actually in 1920 and extending intermittently up to the present day—the Congress adopted the policy of non-violent non-cooperation toward the English government in India.

(This policy has been misinterpreted as meaning absolute pacifism at all times. It does not. It is a highly specialized revolutionary technique developed by Gandhi

with great originality and skill for the particular use of the disarmed Indian people against the English domination. Although pacifism has become Gandhi's personal creed, it has never been accepted as a national policy of the Congress party. The Congress believes in national self-defense against aggression.)

5. The Anti-Axis record of the Congress party is 100 per cent clean. While the rest of us were wining, dining, and bribing the Axis, the Congress refused to meet with them, eat with them, or accept their unlimited offers of bribes, funds, and guns.*

6. The pro-Democracy record of the Congress party is likewise clean: it has been throughout pro-China, pro-Abyssinia, pro-Czechoslovakia pro-Spain, pro-Russia, and pro-Four Freedoms for All.

7. In 1937, in the first, last, and only national elections ever held in India, under the Act of 1935, the Congress won 711 out of a total number of 1,585 seats, or a plurality of 45 per cent of the whole electoral vote, the rest being divided among 15 other groups *including* the Muslim League. The Congress thus won control in eight of the eleven provinces, and coalition in the other three.

8. In 1938, Nehru, foreseeing the immediacy of World War II, created the All-India National Planning Committee (composed of Hindus, Muslims, and Princes' representatives), and laid out a large-scale program based on the urgent necessity for the development of all industries essential to national defense in war-time. (See Appendix, page 134.)

9. In 1939, without asking the advice or consent of a single Indian, the Viceroy declared India at war, and the English (not India) Parliament voted the Viceroy extra-

* See Nehru's account of Mussolini's invitations to him in his autobiography, "Toward Freedom" (John Day).

ordinary powers, including the power to suspend the Constitution.

10. In 1940 occurred a decisive event (never mentioned by the British). Congress decided to take active part in World War II. Gandhi the pacifist retired. Militant Nehru became sole party leader. Nehru wrote, and Congress enthusiastically passed, the Delhi Resolution of July 1940, *offering the British complete military cooperation under a national Indian government*. The Nehru Offer was rejected by the Viceroy.* It was only *after* this rejection that Nehru resigned, and Congress turned back to Gandhi and non-cooperation as their sole method of fighting for freedom. After the failure of the Cripps mission in 1942, Congress was again reduced to the same formula of non-violent battle. The British government's response in both instances was: wholesale imprisonment of Congress leaders and members by the tens of thousands. Nevertheless, despite England, the Congress offer still holds, and will continue to hold, while Gandhi and Nehru lead the party. But Gandhi and Nehru will not last forever.

Muslim Bogey into Frankenstein

The "Hindu-Muslim problem" is apparently the one among the many fictions of the Indian situation that has been accepted most seriously in America. Let us examine it.

First of all, the Muslims are not a separate people. They are Indians who happen to attend a Muslim mosque instead of a Hindu temple. Religious warfare has been a European rather than an Asiatic practice. By dividing

* Full texts of the Nehru Offer and the Viceroy's rejection are printed in the Appendix of Nehru's "Unity of India" (John Day).

There are three roads over the Khwaja Amran Range, of varying length and difficulty, all of which we will suppose the Russians to use, but after passing Quetta, their advance must be made in one long line. The Bolan, the pass from which this route takes its name, is 59 miles in length, offers few camping-grounds, and is in parts excessively steep and narrow; in rugged savageness, and utter barrenness, it may, perhaps, be rivalled by other Afghan defiles—to excel it is impossible. In the hot weather the heat in it is excessive, in the rains it is swept by fierce and sudden floods; the road is shingle and grit, strewn with stones and small boulders, most trying to the horses and transport animals, wearing the feet of the bullocks to the quick; and again and again the road crosses the river, through which the men must wade up to their waists in water.¹

And yet the worst difficulties of this route

¹ In one march alone, fourteen times.—H. B. H.

"Pakistan," the imaginary name of an imaginary separate Muslim state in India, is the peak of the British-Jinnah interplay. Look at your map of India. In the extreme northwest lie the Northwest Frontier Province, Punjab, Sind, and Kashmir. In the extreme east lie Bengal and Assam. Of these two widely separated territories with large Muslim populations, the mythical Pakistan is to be composed. The rest of India would lie, like a gigantic Polish corridor, between them.

The economics of the scheme is as poor as its geography. Professor Behre of Columbia University, expert in geology and mineral economics, has pointed out* that Pakistan lacks all the minerals essential for the survival of an independent state in the modern industrial world: "A division of India along religious lines would destine all of Pakistan to remain . . . economically tributary to Hindustan." He "notes that the Hindu and Muslim areas of India are interdependent economically . . . and urges that political interdependence is a wise solution where economic interdependence is so intimate and so essential." Professor Behre is not British, but American.

Apply elsewhere the Pakistan theory of the right of a religious minority to form a separate state, and what would you get? The Muslims of China and Russia could claim separate states—as indeed they are now being urged to do by Jinnah! But on the same grounds, the Catholics in England could demand a separate Catholic state, and the Non-conformist Welsh could demand a separate Wales . . . the Mormons would have the right to a separate Mormon state, so would the Coughlinites in Detroit, and the Jews in Brooklyn . . . Indians themselves reduced the theory to its real absurdity when they said that in Pakistan itself, the minority Hindus would likewise

* See *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1943, "India's Mineral Wealth and Political Future," by Charles H. Behre, Jr.

demand the right to form a separate Hindu sub-state, and so on ad infin.

The palpable preposterousness of this scheme does not affect its popular appeal when sufficiently publicized, as it is, aided and abetted by the British. It is well known that Pakistan propaganda is being widely distributed to America and elsewhere not from India but from England, where an obscure Muslim, C. R. Ali, original contriver of the whole Pakistan plot, has been living since 1933.* (He is now advocating the pakanization not only of India, but of Russian and Chinese Turkistan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, and Albania—inter alia !). The British government, which deliberately chose to suppress and silence the Gandhi-Nehru policy of a united and democratic India, is giving the widest possible publicity and prestige to the Ali-Jinnah scheme of a divided and parochial India.

British support of the Jinnah position implies that the British government will not voluntarily yield its domination over India to any centralized, unified Indian government, but will substitute its direct domination only for a balance of power control over a divided and sub-divided India.

Unholy War

Beyond the mere balancing of power amongst Indian parties, looms the larger issue implicit in British encouragement of the Jinnah-Pakistan scheme. This is the enormously dangerous possibility of the re-emergence of religious warfare waged as such. Religious wars have left a long and bloody stain throughout European history for many centuries. But with the settlement of the Vatican question

* See *Asiā*, October, 1943, "Pakistan, is it God's Gift to the British Empire?" by Paresh Nath.

and the renunciation of the Caliphate by the national governments of the Muslim countries of the Middle East succeeding the Ottoman Empire, it was felt that religious warfare was at least one thing we had grown out of—that we would, if we had to, fight for our frontiers, or the white cliffs of Dover, or what have you—but that at least we would refrain from involving the Lord in our all too human inadequacies. It would therefore be extremely regrettable if the British use or misuse of the Muslim issue in India should eventually develop, as it very well may, beyond British calculations, into the unconfinable explosions of religious warfare.

Pan-Islamism as a political slogan is as dangerous as would be a political Pan-Catholicism or a Pan-Anglicanism that cut across national geographic frontiers. The Muslim, or Islamic, countries of the Middle East today base their claims to independence on nationalist, not religious grounds.* The Egyptians rightly want their own Egyptian development free from English domination: so do the Turks, the Iraqi, the Syrians and the Saudi Arabians. But the temptation of a Pan-Islamic Caliphate crown, an apple of potential discord, has been for many years surreptitiously suggested, now to one, now to another, of these Muslim states, by the British government, with an extraordinary disregard for dynamite in the consequences. The Muslim states have won the sympathy and support of all democratic nations not as a religious enclave waging holy wars, but as people struggling for national independence. Indeed, no responsible Muslim statesmen make any Pan-Islamic claims; on the contrary, they pointedly disclaim them. The British pull

* "Fortunately however the Kemalist movement had from the outset rejected the ancient Islamic basis of the Ottoman Empire, and proclaimed the modern secular principle of national self-determination." E. H. Carr, *International Relations Since the Peace Treaties*.

it out of their foreign policy portfolios much as a music hall magician pulls out his rabbit when it suits his act. This is international irresponsibility, and should be scotched.

Congress Muslim Policy*

What has been the Congress attitude on this English-Hindu-Muslim problem? Congress believes that whatever tension actually exists between the Hindus and Muslims is due to poverty and economic maladjustment and not to religion. To the Congress, the Muslims are not "a minority"; they are "fellow Indians." Political development, in this century, is normally carried on a national and economic basis, not a religious one. There is no reason for India to be an exception to this rule. There is no question of religious intolerance or religious suppression involved in the Hindu-Muslim problem in India. Every conceivable guarantee of equality of all nationals, regardless of creed, has been made by the Indian Congress. The Karachi Resolution of 1931 states: "No disability attaches to any citizen, by reason of his or her religion, caste, creed or sex in regard to public employment, office of power or honor, and in the exercise of any trade or calling . . . The State shall observe neutrality in regard to all religions."

The Congress has also agreed to refer any disputed points to arbitration, to the International Court, or any other impartial body mutually agreed upon. But the Congress has insisted, in the words of Nehru, that "nothing can be accepted which goes against Indian freedom or democracy, or disrupts India, nor can a minority

* For full discussion of Congress Policy, see Appendix, page 130.

be allowed to dominate or override the majority. After all, the majority has some rights."

It is precisely on this last point, however, the rights of the majority, that England has put her foot down. As we have seen, it is one of the more dogmatic English fictions that the democratic rule of the majority does not apply in India. The Congress even agreed to accept minority Muslim national government, but England disregarded this offer, too. No majority rule—no minority rule—just English rule.

Gandhi : Power-of-Love-Politics

What about non-violence? We Americans have been so accustomed to shooting our way to freedom that it is difficult for us to understand Gandhi's use of non-violence to make India free. There is a long tradition in the East of solving differences by reason rather than by gunpowder, which may be summed up in these great lines from Buddha :

"All that we are is the result of what we have thought . . . If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage . . . If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him, like a shadow that never leaves him . . . 'He abused me, he beat me, he defeated me, he robbed me'—in those who harbor such thoughts, hatred will never cease. For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time ; hatred ceases by love—this is an old rule."

Gandhi has tried to follow this old rule, to make hatred cease by love, in his fight for Indian freedom. His one great aim has been to make revolution by love and not by war. Maybe he was wrong ; maybe love conquers all—except empire. But he wanted to give it a chance, and

so great was the dynamism of his power-of-love politics in India, that the Indian people have been willing to follow him through many long lean years of self-discipline and self-sacrifice. The new India that Gandhi has wrought has love in its heart and steel in its soul. Will it also need steel in its hands before the final goal of freedom is won?

Americans sometimes repeat with approbation the "sound British advice" engraved on an English arch in India: "Liberty will not descend to a people; a people must raise themselves up to liberty." It is, however, extremely difficult for a disarmed people to raise themselves to liberty with the weight of the English Empire, the English Army, the English Navy, the English Air Force, and the Bank of England on their backs—and when they are too honourable and too civilized to take the guns and the money offered to them by Britain's enemies.

Yet they may not remain indefinitely honorable and civilized—they too may become Westernized and realistic.

It would therefore seem only reasonable to suppose that England would make every effort to meet the immediate conciliation of a Gandhi-Nehru Indian government rather than be forced to face the inevitable post-war explosion.

But it is precisely the reasonable that may not be expected in England's behavior toward India. Here we run slam up against the stone wall of one psychological barrier between England and India. To England, India is Empire, and Empire is Glory. This is beyond reason. England wants the Glory even more than she wants the Gold—(and oh, how she wants the Gold!) Holding India has been the prime object of all British foreign policy for the past two centuries. It has cost England a lot of wars, but until recently has not cost her a penny. Wars were mostly paid for out of India.

Now, however, we are all paying for them.

The United Nations in India

This brings us to the problem of the United Nations in India. This is the simplest problem of all, but it depends on the solution of the Indian and English problems in India. Do the United Nations support the legality of the fiction of the divine right of his Britannic Majesty the King-Emperor to rule Indians absolutely in the person of his Viceroy? How do the United Nations stand on India?

On the one hand, there is the British Empire, still pursuing a 19th century imperialist policy covered up by current geopolitical patterns. On the other hand there are Russia and China, numerically and geographically the most powerful members of the United Nations, who are fighting for Indian freedom no less than for their own. Anybody with an inkling of Anglo-Russian and Anglo-Chinese relations of the past 150 years must realize that the elimination of English domination from India is and will remain a vital factor in the national policies of both Russia and China. European and South American nations would also show their sympathy for Indian freedom if they could afford to face English imperial disfavor.

But where does the United States stand on India?—we who have with commendable if somewhat brash and noisy bravado, undertaken the leadership of the United Nations—without the faintest notion of all the hell-to-pay we have let ourself in for!

The Nature of the Revolution

This brings us back to our basic question: Are we for the Indian Revolution—or against it? This war engages all of us in gigantic task of destruction—of destroying what we believe is bad. Let us not, at the same time destroy what is good. The Indian Revolution is a good revolution. It is still a good revolution. All revolutions

probably begin "good"—there is no original sin in the birth of a revolution—sin comes later. Just as the French Revolution tried to bring forth political democracy, and the Russian Revolution economic democracy, so the Indian Revolution is trying to bring forth a kind of psychological democracy, in which a reasoning good-will may create a livable balance between the conflicting, tearing-apart, divergent forces of politics and economics. The power of good-will in international relations may, like the power of radium, prove its beneficence in skilled use.

The Indian Revolution is the first entirely above-ground revolution in history that has undeviatingly followed a policy of using wholly honorable means to achieve its ends—a revolution in which the means were held to be as important as the end—a revolution without hate, without terror, without a spy system, without treachery, without assassination—a revolution in which all the habitual evils of revolution were ruled out. A revolution in which the end is held to be a mutual renunciation of dominating power, and a mutual assumption of cooperating good will.

The Indian Revolution has two aspects, internal and external. Internally, India wants to establish herself as a modern free democracy and to free herself from Britain without bloodshed and without war. Because she is afraid of losing the war? No, on the contrary, because she is so sure of winning it. Her reasoning runs something like this :

"Here we are, a great nation of 390 million people, once ancient and conquered, now renascent, reincarnate, young again, strong . . . We have to some extent industrialized, mechanized, modernized ourselves. Indian soldiers have fought bravely abroad, and tasted victory . . . The sympathy of the United States, Russia, China, the whole free world is with us in our passion to be free

. . . Ultimately, nothing can withstand us—certainly not the five-hundred-odd ruling Britishers who symbolize the power of the British Empire in India. If we wish to use force, we have only to issue a command, and not one of these ruling Britishers in India would be left alive. We know the techniques of revolution. We know how to seize power. We know how Lenin did it, how Hitler and Mussolini did it; we know how Cromwell and Napoleon and Washington did it too. We know we can win the troops and the police, seize the munitions works, the power plants, the railway junctions, the radio, the press,—we know we can kill all the English in India as easily as blowing out a match—and even though the whole British army, navy, air force and imperial power oppose us, we know that after this bloodshed and war, ultimate victory will be ours. . . And we shall then make peace with Britain as a free people . . . We know all this, the world knows it, and surely the British Ruling Caste must know it too. . . . But since we both know it, why should we need to go through this savage ritual of bloodshed and war and more bloodshed and more war, before we arrive at peace? . . . We are neither of us savage people. . . . We are civilized, mature peoples who have experienced and observed the patterns of history. . . . We know the tragic patterns of the past. Must we repeat them over and over again? Can we not learn from them to avoid unnecessary murder and hatred, skip the infantile wars, and advance to the mature peace—in friendship?"

Along some such lines of reasoning, Gandhi and Nehru have led the Indian people in steadfast, undeviating revolution against British rule since 1930, when independence was first declared.

The shot which the Indian Revolution has refrained from firing has been heard round the world. . .

"Why don't they wait until after the war?" Tell a harvest to wait—tell the monsoons to wait. Essentially because the English government no longer commands Indian confidence. Particularly: the administrative record of the English government after 150 years of absolute rule: it has granted unto India a 90 per cent illiteracy, (Japan is only 20 per cent illiterate; the Philippines only 40 per cent), a life span of 26 years (in England, 60 years, in U. S., 63 years), an annual income of \$15 (in Japan three times as high, in England 10 times as high, in U. S. 23 times as high), 18 cents annually per capita national expenditure on education (in England about \$6.50, in U. S. about \$20)—this in one of the greatest and most richly endowed countries on earth. Nothing, they believe, could be worse—no, not even the Japs! They believe that they themselves could do infinitely better for themselves. They do not hate the English. They feel sorry for them, and wish they would go home and take care of England, which needs taking care of. They feel competent to take care of themselves in India.

In external affairs, revolutionary India, once freed from English domination, wants friendly economic and political relations with her democratic neighbours in Asia, and close cooperation with a free world organization. (Note Nehru's important statement on Eastern Federation, Appendix, page 146.)

Revolution by Peace—or War?

India now stands on the threshold of winning her independence. It will not have been granted nor donated by England. It will have been won by the Indian people themselves alone, by their own blood, their own sweat, their own toil and their own tears—and their own brains

—in a revolution unique in history for its powerful self-control, heroic generosity, civilized dignity, and gallantry.

Shall we be responsible for reducing this revolution to the old pattern of terrorism, of underground assassination, of firebrand civil war? We can, if we will, attempt to wreck the Indian Revolution—by discovering forged Zinoviev letters, by spreading misunderstandings, by inciting enmity, by sowing discord, by making India feel that our world is against her, by driving her to desperation, by discrediting Gandhi and Nehru with failure, by evoking the rival forces of destruction and hatred latent in every revolution. Or—we can help to ease the growing pains of revolution. The forces at work in the Indian Revolution are constructive forces—they have vision, imagination, power. They are ready to cooperate with a modern, free world.

It is unlikely, but it is barely possible, that by making itself sufficiently heard, popular opinion in the United States, reinforcing popular opinion in England, could influence the English government to relinquish responsibility to a representative Indian government. With the full cooperation of such an Indian government, the United Nations would have no extraneous problems to solve in India, and could proceed to the job of winning the war—and the peace. We have nothing to lose but our World War III draft numbers. We have our own self-respect, at the very least, to gain.

But it would take nothing less than a revolution in English foreign policy to effect such a change in English policy on India.

Is such a revolution likely?

CHAPTER THREE

Revolution in English Foreign Policy

"The permanent basis of British policy is fixed by the existence of the Indian Empire."

Sir Austen Chamberlain in
The Foreign Policy of the Powers.

Validity

A great deal has been said and written about the democratic revolution in England's economic, political, and social existence since the war. This is entirely admirable. But it deals with only one aspect of the war, England's internal policy. There is another aspect: England's external policy, which in war-time is of even more pressing importance.

Has there been any democratic revolution in England's foreign policy?

In a country devoted to continuity of tradition, nothing has been more continuously traditional than English foreign policy. Cecil and Pitts, Castlereagh and Palmerston, Disraeli and Gladstone, MacDonald and Churchill, governments Tory, Whig, conservative, liberal, labor or national: the same foreign policy has been carried on by them all.

"The general character of England's Foreign Policy," begins the famous summing-up Memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe, "is determined by the *immutable* conditions of her

geographical situation on the ocean flank of Europe as an Island State with vast oversea *colonies and dependencies*, whose existence and survival as an independent country are inseparably bound up with the possession of *preponderant sea power*." (Italics inserted.)

England continues to act today along these traditional 17th, 18th, and 19th century lines, although the conditions of her geographical situation in Europe have been basically mutated by Air Power, although many of her colonies and dependencies are now free dominions and independencies, and although preponderant sea power has passed out of her possession.

What have been the concrete translations of this traditional foreign policy? In Europe, it expressed itself in jiggling the balance of power, in preserving the so-called integrity of the Lowlands, in intervention and/or non-intervention, in the intensive artificial cultivation of the independence of more and smaller European states, and the prevention of the "hegemony" of Europe by any European power. As the vastest oversea colony, India became the juiciest plum in the English crown pudding, and every path leading to the plum was roped into the Life Line of Empire. Honestly regarding Sea Power as its sole prerogative, England's Empire imbibed the Seven Seas by way of the strategic naval bases and later, the oil pipe-lines. From Balance of Power to Sole Sea Power, these are the ancient concepts, hoary with tradition, with which we are all familiar.

Not a single one of them has the slightest validity in the real world of today.

Snake

Modern methods of science, communication, agriculture, trade, commerce, and warfare, have made the unity

of Europe an accomplished physical fact. Playing balance of power politics in Europe today is like playing tiddleywinks for pennies in the New York Stock Exchange. When Talleyrand defined Palmerston's policy of non-intervention as signifying much the same thing as intervention, his reply in the 1840's became a "famous mot" ; today, in the 1940's it is a semantic commonplace to which schoolboys are wise. Air-power has invalidated the integrity of the Lowlands as a means of security for England. Today other means must be found. The traditional English slant has accustomed us to regard the "hegemony" of Europe as somewhat in the nature of an unpleasant social disease, like halitosis without Listerine or syphilis before 666. Actually, hegemony in Europe by its most responsible members is as unescapable and undeniable and altogether natural as the hegemony of the United States in the Pan American Union or of England in the British Isles or the Commonwealth ; it needs only a new label to render it politically palatable. The freedom and independence of small (European) nations has had a peculiarly strong, perhaps compensatory, tropism for English lay writers, from Byron in Greece to Rebecca West in Serbia. Nevertheless the fact must be faced that it is as idle today to urge the unrelated independence of little nations in Europe as it would be to urge the independence of Wales—or Wyoming.

By virtue of its fully awakened nationalism and its rapidly developing industrialization, by virtue of having produced two of the greatest living men of the century in Gandhi and Nehru, India has already won its own independence—although the fiction that India is still imprisoned in its two-century-old political purdah is still maintained in the rhetoric of the elder English statesmen (to the detriment of morale throughout the United Nations). What avail today to say that the Atlantic Charter does not

apply to India, when India wrote its own Indian Charter over a decade ago? Even Canute knew better.

The route to India, i.e., the military-naval possession of Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden, and Singapore, key approaches to India, had two objects: to keep English Power in India, and to keep Other Powers out of India; both objects being based on one premise: that India was unarmed and dependent. Today, however, India is armed—before this war is over, it will have one of the great armies of the earth, and this army will not permit itself to be disarmed and disbanded as did the Indian army of 1918. And today England is, in fact, far more dependent on India than vice versa. Therefore, for English foreign policy to hold, fight and die for the possession of the Route to India when it no longer possesses India, is to reduce foreign policy to a certain anachronistic absurdity, a form of political *Subrealisme*.

Even as a thing in itself, the traditional English use of the Mediterranean as an exclusive English tub is hardly tenable. No Spanish government, Franco or Free or Federated, can any longer tolerate the English navy in their own waters, nor the Union Jack over the Spanish earth of Gibraltar.

Similarly, English monopoly possession of Malta, Cyprus, Suez, and Aden is as fundamentally unsupportable to the modern States of the Mediterranean and the Middle East as was the Spanish possession of Cuba in the Caribbean to the United States, or as the foreign possession of the Channel Isles would be to England.

There is a tendency among Anglo-American liberals to use the word "internationalize" as an over-all solution to problems in foreign affairs, somewhat as pioneer children wore a bag of "salsifeddity" tied on a string round their necks to ward off all diseases. Politics are not quite so simple. Every little island, every little naval base, every

little pipe-line, is a problem all its own and demands its own solution. One can no more demand of the people of Spain that they submit to the internationalization of Gibraltar than one can demand of the people of England that they submit to the internationalization of Land's End. In any case, nationalization normally precedes internationalization, which can be justly arrived at only by and with the consent of those to be internationalized.

Whether Singapore is "retaken" this year or next, it has no permanent place as a British base. In the New Asia that is on the horizon—and not all the King's Navy can hold back that dawn—with the unprecedented renaissance of a Free China of 400 millions, a Free India of 390 millions, a defeated and therefore liberal Japan, a victorious and indefinitely powerful Asiatic Russia, liberated Filipinos, East Indians, Malaysians—in this powerful new world on the greatest of the continents, little Singapore as the defense of largely non-existent predominating British interests becomes definitely Gilbert-and-Sullivan.

Whatever its initial advantages, no doubt considerable, the Life Line of Empire is to England and the Free Commonwealths today what the snake was to the Laocoön group.

Just as the modern democratic revolution in internal affairs demands a redistribution of the means of power, so and even more so does the revolution in foreign affairs. Seven Seas may well prove about six too many for any one empire to be on—and live to write home about it. Since Mahan spilled the beans on the technique of acquiring a monopoly in Sea Power, everybody is using the method, and the monopoly no longer exists. Despite the Seven-Ocean-Navy type-dreams of our neo-super-mahans, the daring desk men of our too manifest destiny, a sound redistribution of Sea Power is on the cards. After all, grabbing and holding *All* the Naval-oil-Air-Bases is not the

alpha and omega, the apex and culmination of Anglo-American civilization—or is it? Surely not in our own New Order interpretation.

American Precedent

The United States government has already set a far-sighted and revolutionary precedent on three vital issues in international relations: 1. the settlement of the oil question with Mexico; 2. the voluntary surrender of extra-territorial so-called "rights" (meaning wrongs) in China; 3. the President's reiteration of the pledge of freedom to our imperialistically conquered possession of the Philippines. These three acts have been worth more in the morale of winning the war than a dozen mechanized divisions, a hundred Spitfires, and a cartload of Atlantic Charters hamstrung with due regard to existing, and ossifying, obligations.

But in Mexico, England still insists on her 19th century interpretation of the individual property rights of a few English traders as over against the national rights of the Mexican people to the natural resources of their own land. In China, by freely renouncing her predatory positions of power in the Chinese rivers and sea ports, England might have retained her prestige, her self-respect, and the regard of the Chinese people. By holding them until they were forcibly wrested from her by the Japanese, by still insisting on her "rights" to Hongkong and Kowloon, England has lost not only her purse and her pants, but even her face.

In 1776, we, the people of the United States, freed ourselves from England, and in 1936, we freed the Filipinos from ourselves: there is a connection between these acts, and all the world is aware of its significance—except apparently England. Today, England is repeating in India,

neighbor of the Philippines, the same fatal error she made with the American colonies two centuries ago when she termed rebels those who were already powerfully free men.

The overwhelming majority of the people of the United Nations—the Russians, Chinese, and Indians—are *not* fighting and winning this war for the Further Expansion of the British Empire : nor to realize the Cecil Rhodes Destiny-Dream of All the Continents and All the Seas and All the Skies under the Benevolent (to Anglo-Americans) Anglo-American Domination. The United Nations are *not* fighting for Anglo-American control of their resources, their trade, their naval bases and their air ports ; nor of their centuries. They are fighting for a new and good and modern life for themselves and their peoples. It is just as well to keep this distinction clearly in mind, for confusions and delusions on this vital point may prove dangerous later on.

Imperial Carbuncles

Nothing less than an unprecedented democratic revolution in England's hoary and rutted foreign policy would seem to be necessary to bring it in line with the facts of life of the second world war in the first half of the twentieth century.

(It is not generally known that in England the control of foreign policy is the exclusive prerogative of the Cabinet. Parliament has no power to make foreign policy. There is not even a Committee on Foreign Affairs in Parliament—as there is in both houses of the American Congress. All that Parliament can do is to vote for or against foreign policy already made by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. This vote is often too late to make any real difference in the policy. Parliament may vote a lack

of confidence in the government, obliging it to call for a general election. But the cost and dislocation of such a general election is so great that it is seldom attempted. Imperial foreign policy thus remains outside the effective scope of Parliament, and beyond the direct reach of popular opinion. Incidentally, by traditional gentleman's agreement among the political parties, imperial policy on India is rarely publicly debated.)

What would such a democratic revolution in England's foreign policy actually involve? It would mean the voluntary surrender of excess privilege, excess power, accumulated like carbuncles through the centuries. It would mean:

1. Immediate acknowledgment of the independence of India.

2. The unconditional surrender of extra-territoriality in all its phases in China, *including the return of Hongkong and Kowloon.*

3. The reversion to national ownership of those natural resources of foreign countries under British financial control, as: the oil of Iraq, Iran, Sarawak, Rumania, Mexico, etc.

Point 3 has two important boomerangs: it would refer likewise to American-controlled oil in Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, etc., as well as to American shares in British controlled areas. It would lead to nationalization of natural resources in Britain and the United States no less than abroad.

4. Redistribution of Sea Power and Air Power.

Guarantee English Security

On such a basis, it may well be asked: what happens to the security of England? Clearly, it would need to be guaranteed by the United States and the British Common-

wealths. But no price is too great to pay for the world equilibrium that might result from a democratic readjustment of England's foreign policy. In such an equilibrium, security becomes a natural instead of a highly precarious and uncertain element in international relations.

The final question remains: how can a revolution in England's foreign policy be brought to life? There is little hope that it will occur by consent of the present ruling group, nor is it very likely to come from pressure of the democratic impulse latent in the English people, who are too immediately concerned in winning the war. It can hardly happen as a result of the pressure of American opinion, public or official. But there is a fourth possibility which seems to me the most likely one: that the revolution in England's policy will occur *ex post facto*, after the deed is done, after the revolutionary act has been effected from without by the peoples concerned, as the thirteen colonies once effected their own revolution, and that, faced with the accomplished fact, England will acknowledge the inevitable—and soon thereafter, with her accustomed grace, claim to have been its inspiration, fountain-head, and fostering-parent.

And who shall deny her?

But what price this revolution in wasted blood, in wasted tears, in wasted toil, is another and more sombre question.

(Can this tragic waste be avoided? Many informal attempts to encourage conciliation and understanding between India and England have been made in America, among them a dinner forum on India's Independence Day, 26 January 1943, on "India's Place in the Democratic World," at which the following speech was delivered.)

CHAPTER FOUR

Free India Now

"Experience shows that the first casualty of peace is such wisdom, if any, as has been learned in war . . . The only important measures of reconstruction which emerged from the last war were those enacted while it was still being fought. We should profit by that lesson. We ought to lay legislative foundations of the new order now."

R. H. Tawney.

January 26 means to India what July 4 means to us, July 14 to France, November 7 to Russia, October 10 to China.

Thirteen years ago, the Indian people took for the first time the Pledge of Purna Swaraj or Complete Independence. Since then, India has been celebrating her Independence Day in a rather odd way—all by herself: no other nations sent cables of felicitations—nobody knew—except of course the English government in India, and they weren't telling: they were giving it the hush-hush treatment, the if-you-don't-admit-a-fact-it-doesn't-exist treatment.

On most January 26ths of the past thirteen years, India's great leaders have been in prison—as they are in prison tonight. Nehru once wrote that under the English rule all roads in India lead to prison. But if Nehru, instead of being an Indian, had only belonged to a small European nation, if he were say a Yugoslav or Greek, urging freedom

now for his people, he wouldn't be in prison—he'd be sent on an American tour by the British Information Services!

We have been very slow-witted about facing the political facts of life in the East. China declared herself an independent republic in 1911, but it was not until 1942, thirty-one years later, that we admitted the fact of her independence by rescinding what we elegantly termed our extra-territorial rights, which were of course nothing but low-grade racketeering on the grand imperial scale. And even today England is still trying to pull some hocus-pocus about her "legal" rights to Hong Kong. It took us thirty-one years, and two World Wars to admit facts in China. How long will it take us in India?

Sir Norman Angell wrote recently to the *New York Times* that "another authoress—Frances Gunther—assures us that unless the United States government supports *what she terms* the Indian revolution," etc. His implication is that there is no Indian revolution, but the fact is that for at least thirteen years, all up and down the length and breadth of India, from the highest Himalayas down to Ceylon, from Karachi all the way across to Calcutta, the people of India have been gravely shouting, "Inquilab Zindabad! Long live the Revolution!"

This shout has been reverberating throughout India, throughout Asia, throughout the world. But was it heard at No. 10 Downing Street? No—they weren't listening—perhaps they were too busy hearing themselves talk—even though they were just saying the same old things over and over again. Perhaps they didn't believe it was a revolution because the Indians didn't shoot. The English have a tendency not to take people seriously until they shoot. They forget that an idea may be more implacable than a Spitfire. They still do not realize that the only thing that stands between them and a shooting

India is the unique will to love and non-violence of one Indian, Gandhi—and that when India begins to shoot, it may be too late to listen.

India wants her independence now, during the war, because she believes that later, during the peace, may be too late, and that only in the stress of wartime will England make what she still prefers to term "concessions." India fears that England's willingness to concede, minute as it is now in war, may disappear in peace—that the possibility of a peaceful transition from Indian subjugation to Indian independence may likewise disappear with English victory—and that India may then find that the only way she can achieve her independence is by the one way she has so valiantly tried to avoid: revolution by violence and bloodshed.

This is what one of India's leading statesmen, C. R. Rajagopalacharya, had in mind when he said in an interview in Delhi with Herbert Matthews of the *New York Times*: "The Indians will come to dislike Allied successes if they merely increase British arrogance—as evidenced by Mr. Churchill's speech on holding his own. Will America support India's fight for independence after this war, if during the war, you allow yourself to be dictated to by Mr. Churchill? . . . You can win the war without us, but you cannot win it the way you want to win it."

Mr. Churchill is a great Englishman, and Churchillism in England today is a great force. But Churchillism in *India* is another matter—it is 18th century King-Emperor-Feudalism imposed like a straitjacket upon the 20th century Asiatic world. Mr. Churchill has expressed his war aims in these words: "We have but one aim . . . to extirpate Hitlerism from Europe." In which we all heartily concur. But to this one aim, another has been added by the free peoples of all the United Nations: *To extirpate Churchillism from India*. Indeed, until Churchillism is extirpated

from India, Hitlerism cannot be permanently extirpated from Europe.

Allied victory is tangibly in sight. It gives us a sense of confidence, of security, of power over our own destinies. But would it not be profoundly regrettable if the 390 million people of India came to believe that their hope of Indian independence must be submerged in the event of British victory? Would it not be preferable from all points of view to have the Indian people share with us the hope that a United Nations victory would mean to them also, as it does to us, a sense of confidence, of security, of power over their own destinies?

In her fight for freedom, India has had the gallant support of her neighbor, China. Participating in the *Herald Tribune* Forum, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek said, "China not only fights for her own independence, but also for the liberation of every oppressed nation . . . We must begin today and not tomorrow to apply these principles among ourselves even at some sacrifice to our individual countries."

Although Russia has been too deeply engrossed in fighting off the German armies to make an issue of Indian independence, there is no doubt but that the peoples of the Soviet Union have every natural sympathy with India's fight for freedom.

Why are we here tonight?

We are here in an attempt to avert catastrophe. In doing so, we are bucking up against the imperial will of Mr. Churchill, of whom we are all otherwise so fond and so proud. We are asserting our will against Mr. Churchill's, who is a very wilful man. This would be a naive thing to do and dangerous—if time and the tide of history were not on our side. But time and tide are all too clearly on our side. And when we do assert ourselves against Mr. Churchill in regard to India, it is as much for his sake

and for England's sake, as it is for India's. We do not wish Mr. Churchill to reenact in Indian history, the avoidable tragedy enacted by George III in American history.

Most Englishmen—even liberals like Sir Norman Angell, who have freed themselves from the Great Illusion—still hug a Great Delusion, which is even more dangerous: the Great Delusion that there is Security in Empire, and that the more Empire, the more Security. But there is no security merely in empire—as all empires have discovered to their sorrow too late. *There is security only in the faith of free men in each other.* Security is not based solely on the possession of naval bases nor dominant sea power nor dominant air power nor imperial possessions; it is based on mutual confidence between peoples who are, in word and deed, good neighbors. But there can be no faith and no confidence between a conqueror and a conquered people—nor can there be security for either one. We are here because we are concerned for the security of England no less than for the independence of India. While she possesses India, England cannot be secure.

Our differences with Mr. Churchill's government in regard to Indian freedom lie largely in timing and in tempo. They think that the next century is plenty of time for Indian freedom. We know that even today is rather late—if we still hope to avoid that racial war with an outraged Asia to which Mr. Churchill's blind intransigence may lead us. Englishmen of modern minds know this with us, and have said so for years.

Lawrence of Arabia—who was a poet forced by the unreal exigencies of imperial policy to become a soldier, who tried to understand the East, held his ear to the earth, and listened, and heard—wrote in 1920: "The East is today a world of changes so great and swift that in comparison, our Europe is standing still, and for all we know, Asia may be gaining on us mentally." For a quarter-

century, Asia has been gaining on us mentally, and Asia will not wait—not even for the considerable charms of Mr. Churchill. We cannot hold Asia back ; we can only use our good offices to urge England forward, with us and with Asia.

There is a categorical imperative in politics no less than in ethics. We cannot accept Mr. Churchill's position on India while we wage war on aggressors elsewhere. There is also a single standard in international no less than in national and personal morality. We cannot imprison great democrats like Gandhi and Nehru while we tell the world we are fighting this war for freedom.

We stand committed to friendship with England, and to freedom everywhere, including India. These two commitments must be made compatible.

Indian independence is no more a debatable issue than Chinese or English independence. India, and India alone, has the right to determine the course her revolution shall take, and the form her independence shall assume, with a government of the Indian people, by the Indian people, and for the Indian people.

The people of America, England, Russia, and China, remembering their own great revolutionary traditions, will stand by the Indian people in their fight for freedom—until that freedom is won.

(Appeals to Reason and Common Sense in regard to India have had little effect on Mr. Churchill's Government. Indeed, the very mention of Indian independence by his own colleagues in the Cabinet is said to have evoked only the choleric roar of the balked and infuriated lion in the First Minister of the King Emperor of India . . . But could the free Men and Women of England be appealed to over the leonine head of their leader? The following was addressed to the people of England in the summer of 1941.)

CHAPTER FIVE

Free England Now

"India is our prize possession. We in England have to live on it; the Indians may live in it . . . It is the task for you, the younger generation, to hold India to the last drop of your blood."

Lord Birkenhead to Oxford Students in 1927,
quoted by J. E. Kennan in *A Steel Man in India*.

"I am convinced that the large majority of people in England are weary of Empire and hunger for a real new order. But we have to deal, not with them, but with their Government, and we have no doubt in our minds as to what that Government aims at. With that we have nothing in common, and we shall resist to the uttermost."

Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Unity of India*.

Men and Women of England: You have called into being a Free France Movement. You have called into being movements for a Free Belgium, a Free Holland, a Free Denmark, a Free Norway, a Free Poland, a Free Greece, a Free Yugoslavia.

Have you ever thought of evoking among yourselves a movement for a Free England?

Not to free yourselves from your external enemies—you have always kept your freedom from that—but to free yourselves from the strangling clutch of your own empire, and the suicidal delusions of your own imperial grandeur?

You have been proud, in your understating way, of possessing the world's biggest empire—but has it ever

occurred to you that you no longer possess your empire, but that it possesses you?

Has it ever occurred to you that you are not really having a good time, and that you are not really living a good life—even though you have worked so hard to grab and hold on to a quarter of the earth's surface?

Have you ever stopped to think that since you became the world's biggest empire, you have not produced a single painting, a single piece of music, a single book, a single play, a single poem, or any work of art that is equal to the best of the world's lesser powers?

And have you ever really realized that although you were the world's richest empire, your own people were the least cherished, and their homes the dreariest in all Europe?

Have you ever thought that Elizabethan England, which possessed not a stitch of land beyond its own salt water girdle produced Shakespeare, and that Georgian England with its vast Empire Beyond the Seas, has produced Noel Coward?

When you so resolutely sing Rule, Britannia in your unmusical voices—(you sang lovely songs in the days of Elizabeth but you gave all that up when you began possessing places)—when you sing Rule, Britannia, rule the waves, Britons never will be slaves, don't you realize that you are slaves, that you are slaves of the waves you rule? And that since you rule most of the waves, or try to, you have become the most enslaved of the world's great peoples?

Armada was a glorious victory, because you were defending your own shores, but have you ever stopped to think where you have gone from there? The little wooden wall of ships that defended this England so gallantly is now a gigantic steel vise that holds the earth in its grip. The Lorelei of sea power has lured you clear

round the world to Singapore, which is a long, long way from the white cliffs of Dover.

On your way round, your ships' guns took Gibraltar from the Spanish people, and Malta from the Maltese, Egypt and the Suez from the Egyptian people, and Aden from the Arab people, and all the power of India from the people of India ; you took Singapore and the Malayas from the Malayan people, and the cohesion of China from the Chinese people. Remember?

And every time you took a place, you had to take another place to "defend" the first. And every time you extended your line, you had to enlarge your fleet. And every time you enlarged your fleet, you had to take another base, another coaling station, and another trading port . . . And when ships became oil-driven, you had to take bases with oil, and you had to take the oil-lands from the people they belonged to, and so you had to enlarge your fleet, and so you had to extend your line . . . Remember?

And in order to do all this taking and all this extending, you had to do a great deal of warring, but whether you were warring for another trading port, or another coaling station, or another base, or another oil-pipe-line, you always said you were warring for the freedom and democracy of the world . . . Remember?

You always got your additional ports and stations and bases and pipe-lines, and sometimes a little spot of democracy did dribble out eventually here and there, and in the old, slow days before the radio and before the air-plane, it all seemed all right enough. At least, nobody seemed to mind—at least, if they did mind, nobody else knew about it or heard about it much, did they?

But now it is the days after the radio and after the air-plane, and there is very rapid communication and transportation, and times have changed, and people have

changed, and sometimes we wonder whether you know that things and times and peoples have changed. We wonder because you still go on using the same old words in the same old way—because your government still goes on making speeches like the speeches of Pitt and Canning and Castlereagh and Palmerston—and still carries on the foreign policies of the 18th and 19th centuries, although we are nearly half way through the bloody twentieth century. Sometimes we wonder whether you realize that this is now the twentieth century?

We wonder, because although we hear many miraculous tales of the birth of democracy in Britain, since the war, we do not hear anything about the birth of democracy in your foreign policy, do we?

We have not yet heard any miraculous tale of the birth of democracy for India, have we?

We have not yet heard of your righting the wrongs you have done to the peoples of Spain, Egypt, Arabia, Africa, and Asia, whose possessions you have taken by aggressive navalism. Not yet, have we?

We wonder whether you realize that the basic principles of the foreign policy of your governments from Pitt to Churchill have been and apparently still are these:

1. The continued possession of India.
2. The continued domination of all the seas of the earth.
3. The continued prevention of the unification of the states of continental Europe.

We wonder whether you realize that you have been killing a great many people and dying yourselves and persuading many other nations to slaughter each other quite futilely for generations in order to carry out these policies?

Perhaps you do not, because your governments have always translated these policies into a special verbiage for

popular consumption. The policy of the possession of India has become that mystic battle-cry and tribal call to the English holy wars: "For the Life Line of Empire!"

The domination of all the seas undergoes a sea change and emerges as "The Freedom of the Seas."

To prevent the unification of Europe, it is announced that Britain is crusading for the "Restoration of the Independence of the Small Nations of Europe."

We often wonder, when your governments go on and on and on using this same old verbiage, whether you still believe them, or think that anybody believes them? We hope you don't, because nobody else does.

When you speak, as you so incessantly do, of your Life Line of Empire, do you really think it is a Life Line, and if so, what can you really think of Life? Or do you really know what you mean by the Life Line? Your government does, but do you? Do you fondly imagine that you are defending England when you defend the Life Line of Empire? Or do you know that in defending the Life Line of Empire, you are defending, *not* England, *not* the Commonwealth, but your Imperial Possessions Beyond the Seas, primarily India?

Do you realize that the maintenance of your Possession of India, and not the defense of England, has been for centuries, and still is, the central pivotal point of your government's foreign policy and naval policy?

Do you realize that your government's fear of losing its possession of India has been the basic cause of every war it has waged for two centuries?

For when your government speaks, as it still so mellifluously does, of defending the Life Line of Empire, it means that in order to hold its possession of India, it must control and hold, at whatever cost, all the strategic approaches to India. These approaches to India have become more numerous and more technically difficult to

hold with the passage of time and with the development of means of communication and transportation, methods of warfare, and the national evolution of peoples. Your government means that in order to hold on to its possession of India, it must conquer and hold, at whatever cost, Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden and Singapore. These are just five tiny red spots on the map, but in order to hold them, your government must effectually control and dominate three continents, Europe, Africa, and Asia, and seven seas, the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean.

It is quite a job to dominate three continents and seven seas, even for English men of power, who rather fancy themselves as natural dominators, and it has kept you busy for some three centuries, waging wars and winning wars, killing and dying, and persuading lots of other people to wage and win wars and to kill and die, for you. It has kept you so busy that perhaps it is no wonder that you have not had time to sit down and think back to what all this killing and dying and warring was *ABOUT* and what you were doing it all *FOR*.

You were doing it all for the possession of India

But why possess India?

Is there Freedom in your possession of India? No.

Is there Democracy in your possession of India? No.

Is there Independence of Nations in your possession of India? No.

None for India. *And none, furthermore, for yourselves.*

For what have you got out of your possession of India, you Men and Women of England?

A handful of you have got money out of it, lots of money, and another handful of you have got power out of it, lots of power. (And, of course, the polo). These few men of money and power turned India into a slave

agricultural country—but at the same time they turned England no less into a slave manufacturing country. They turned your sunny English meadows into smoke-black factory towns, and your tidy English homes into beggarly slums. And they under-dogged you until you became the poorest physical specimens of Europe. I have seen the peoples of five continents, and nowhere in the world have the people had less, and the men of power more, than in England. Nowhere in the world have so many owed so little to so few who had so much.

They let you shout your heads off in Hyde Park, for all the good it ever did you, and told you you were free, free to shout. They told you that India was the brightest jewel in the crown of the Empire, but what did the possession of India mean to you, Men and Women of England, but slums and wars and more slums and more wars?

For the Life Line of Empire was never Your Life Line, Men and Women of England. Once it was a Gold Line and a Power Line for your men of gold and power. But now it has become a Death Line in which they have entangled and are strangling themselves, You, India, and the World. Any time any government anywhere makes any move in any direction, your men of power fear that this move may eventually reach India, and that they may lose their own clutch on India.

They will not allow India to educate itself, free itself, arm itself, nor defend itself. Possessed India, a vast country with a vast population and vast riches, unarmed and helpless, is a basic structural maladjustment in the modern world, is the crux of twentieth century wars. Until India is independent and self-armed, Asia cannot be organized for peace, and until Asia is organised for peace, the whole world must be disorganized for war, more and more war.

We have faith in you, Men and Women of England.

But frankly, we put no trust in the princely words of your government. It drinks scotch, but it thinks bourbon. We listen to its rhythmic eighteenth-century rhetoric with interest, but not with confidence. As it so stoutly and resonantly swears to restore freedom and independence to the nations under foreign domination, we recall that it is suppressing freedom and independence in nations under its own domination, and that the English jails of India are filled with Indians whose only crime is their belief in Indian freedom.

If your government tries to tell you that it cannot exist without the slave base of a subject India, then dismiss your government for incompetence in politics, inadequacy in economics, and betrayal of the democratic faith of the modern world which it pretends to profess.

Set yourselves free by freeing India. For you will never be free while India is slave.

Men and Women of England:

Aren't you beginning to feel a bit fed up with the endless drudgery of policing the world, of shop-keeping for the world, of bookkeeping for the world, and minding the whole world's business?

Have you ever thought of contemplating your navel for a change, instead of your navy? Have you ever thought of cultivating your own English garden? Have you ever thought of relaxing? Of becoming naive again? Simple?

Your men of power have been so sophisticated, so complex, so acute, so frightfully clever, such statesmen! such diplomatists! such politicians! such financiers! such orators!

And where did it get you? And where did it get all the rest of us? Into two world wars in twenty-five years. Into lunatic death and damnation.

So you will win World War II—and grab the juiciest bits of the Italian and Japanese Empires—just as you grabbed the German and Turkish imperial places after World War I. So what? So we'll have World War III.

Maybe you were too clever. Maybe you need a rest. Maybe we were all too clever and need a rest.

Of course there will always be an England. But also, there will always be a Europe, and there will always be an Asia, and there will always be an India too.

There are less than 50 million Britishers. But there are over 1,950 million Other People in the world. Has it never occurred to you that they may like to live a free life of their own, without being pushed around by British imperial rulers?

Men and Women of England:

For over three hundred years you have waged incessant wars against all the peoples of the earth, first briefly and necessarily to make yourselves secure, and then for a long time to make yourselves powerful.

In the long course of these wars, you have multiplied the territory under your domination over one hundred and forty times; you have made over four hundred million non-English people your subjects you have grown twelve times as big as the United States Empire, seven times as big as the whole continent of Europe, three times as big as the French Empire, and sixty times as big as the German Empire; you have become the biggest, richest, and most powerful empire in the history of the world; yourselves numbering less than one-fortieth of the world's population, your empire covers one-fourth of the earth's best surface and includes the earth's richest resources; beyond the boundaries of your empire, your financial and economic power dominates the whole earth; and you have achieved all this by means of many things, but primarily

by means of the most aggressive, the most militant, the most ruthless, and the most successful naval domination in the annals of mankind. (*After the conquest, you were always kind, in your fashion.*)

In the long course of these wars, you have fought, conquered, carved, and hi-jacked the Portuguese Empire, the Spanish Empire, the Dutch Empire, the French Empire, the Indian Empire, the Chinese Empire, the Turkish Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German Empire, the Italian Empire and the Japanese Empire.

Surely, Britons, for history it is enough!

Surely, even for Mr. Churchill, it should be enough! *

Men and Women of England:

The possession of India is *not* the brightest jewel in the English Crown—it is rather the darkest blot on the bright English 'scutcheon. It is in the Commonwealth of Free Nations that your true English glory lies. Here is your real achievement: the solid homespun cloth of English peoples, pioneers, builders. It is your Commonwealth of Free Nations that *is* the English Crown. It needs no alien jewels.

The people of the United States are interested in associating themselves with the peoples of the Free Commonwealth—but *not* with the continued British domination over India. They wish to isolate themselves from complicity in your government's policy of ruling India, but they do not wish to isolate themselves from world responsibility. On the contrary, they are eager to share common responsibility for a free world with all free peoples, especially with the Free Commonwealth.

The countries of the Free Commonwealth—without India—cover a territory many times the size of all Europe. Together with the United States, they effectively control a very large portion of the earth's resources and power.

* See Winston Churchill's *The World Crisis*, last chapter.

Surely, Men and Women of England, for a good life, it is enough. For a free life, in a free England, in a free world, it is plenty!

(The possession of India has become as obsessing a habit with England as the use of a powerful narcotic. Yet many far-sighted Englishmen—like Richard Cobden, quoted below—had long ago foreseen the day when England would have to stand on her own, without India, without foreign Empire, and without fear.)

CHAPTER SIX

England Without india

"It will be a happy day when England has not an acre of territory in Continental Asia. But how such a state of things is to be brought about is more than I can tell. I bless my stars that I am not in a position to be obliged to give public utterance to my views on the all-absorbing topic of the day, for I could not do justice to my own convictions and possess the confidence of any constituency in the kingdom. For where do we find even an individual who is not imbued with the notion that England would sink to ruin if she were deprived of her Indian Empire? Leave me, then, to my pigs and sheep, which are not labouring under any such delusions."

Richard Cobden in a letter to John Bright, about 1857; quoted by Bertrand Russell in *Freedom versus Organization*.

Tax Britannica

The most interesting aspect of Mr. Churchill's notorious line, "We mean to hold our own," is its implication that Mr. Churchill may not be unaware of the probability of losing Our Own. By Our Own, Mr. Churchill means, of course, what is Not Our Own; he does not mean the white cliffs of Dover, nor even the playing fields of Harrow: he means, oddly enough when you come to think of it, India.

Obvious to all the world, and perhaps even to the private mind of Mr. Churchill, is the fact that India will not be held.

Ways and means of effecting the break in the unnatural relations between England and India as undisastrously and sanely as possible, have been studied for many years by liberal minds in both countries.

Nehru, writing in January 1939, said: "India, achieving her independence in this way (i.e. by agreement), would not look unfavourably to certain privileges in the way of trade and commerce being granted to Britain. She might even accept certain financial burdens which in justice should not fall on her. We would be willing to pay this price for freedom with peace, for the cost of conflict will, in any event, be much greater. India would also be a friend and colleague in world affairs, provided Britain stood for freedom and democracy."

Sir Stafford Cripps gave much time and thought to the problem, and in his private and really valuable visit to India in 1940, discussed its various economic aspects with Indian leaders. Since then Sir Stafford has been made the sacrificial goat on the altar of what he honestly believed to be the interests of national unity, but what has turned out to be merely the interests of Mr. Churchill's somewhat psychopathological will to English imperial power. But Sir Stafford's sound knowledge of the problem will remain a vital factor in the future relations between the two countries long after Mr. Churchill's imperial purple rhetoric has been retired to the book-shelves for future generations to marvel at.

Today, the United States, as a member of the United Nations, is taking an active interest in the Indian question. This interest was forced upon us not by India but by England. Since England accepted Lend-Lease, we have become unavoidably involved in her bookkeeping. All bookkeeping in England leads to India.

A long and learned financial-economic section should follow here, giving really reliable facts and figures on the

money relations between England and India. It will not follow because they do not exist. or if they do, they are not available outside the India Office and the British Exchequer. The figures for British investments in India have been simultaneously and divergently given as 875 million pounds by Sir James Grigg (former finance minister to the British government of India), as 500 million pounds by Lord Kindersley, London financial expert, and 1,000 million pounds by the *Manchester Guardian*. Just before Lend-Lease, widely differing figures on British overseas investments were published by the U. S. Treasury Department and the Department of Commerce. I tried to check on all these figures, but it was like checking on interpretations of the Gospels: it got you nowhere.

It is generally accepted that Britain's capital investment in India—where one-half or a whole billion pounds—represents about one-fourth of her total overseas investments. India's population is about four-fifths of the Empire's 500 millions; but Britain's trading, shipping, and banking business with India is only one-fifth of her total; about 150 million pounds goes from India to Britain annually as dividends, etc. These listed figures are mere trifles. The real booty lies in the figures that can never be published: the figures implicit in British control of Indian trade, Indian tariff, and the whole structure of Indian currency.

The Pax Britannica of the 19th century was to India a tax britannica—and the tax was not on pax but on war. Lord Morley once said in the House that England had waged one hundred and eleven wars in the 19th century which had not cost her a penny. Who paid for them? Ask the India Office.

After World War I, India began peeping out of her economic purdah, but England pulled down the blinds with the imperial preference system of the Ottawa Agree-

ment of 1932. India never agreed, India protested, India voted No, but the Ottawa "agreement" went through just the same. English imports into India, which had dropped to 35%, were raised to 40%, and while duty on British cotton goods was lowered, the duty in Japanese goods was raised to 50%, and during 1933 to as high as 75% (which is one of the basic economic reasons of these Japanese wars we are now engaged in).

Figures are currently being presented to prove that India is making a lot of money out of this war, and has "redeemed nearly all government and government guaranteed debts." These figures fail to mention two essential facts: 1. India's staggering national debt is not government guaranteed; it amounted, as of March 1941, to 936 million pounds: i.e. India still owes England over four billion dollars for having conquered her. 2. The English government of India still controls the Indian budget, and can do what it likes with it, when it likes. Under the so-called Constitution of the India Act of 1935, the Indian National Assembly has the right to go through the motions of voting on budgets, but the joker is that their vote makes no difference, because the Viceroy has the right to enforce his budget bills even when defeated. The War Supplementary Budget of 1941 was defeated—but it was collected. It may be expedient during the war to allow certain debts to be redeemed, but the moment war is over, and English power safe, the government can clamp down anything. It is well known that England survived going off English gold in 1931 because she was able to go on Indian gold—by manipulating the rupee in relation to sterling in such a way, entirely legal and constitutional of course, that over two hundred million pounds in gold were somehow eased out of India into England. It could be done again, under the Constitution.

Where did all the gold of India go to? This is one of

the most fascinating mysteries of economic history, and if *the inside story is ever told, will make wonderful reading.* Part of it went, in India, into administration, public works, the army, debt services, etc., outside of India, into building the great English nabob estates and industrial towns of the 18th and 19th centuries, and more recently into investments beyond the political confines of the British Empire.

But the greater part of all the great wealth England took from India went into wars to hold India. That is, the long-standing "connexion" as the English are fond of calling it, resolved itself into a vicious and endless circle of waste: to hold India, England had to wage wars; to pay for the wars, she had to hold India. This process is still going on. In the beginning, the wars were cheap, and the returns from holding India were high—they much more than paid for the cost of holding it. Today, however, the wars are bigger, better, faster, more frequent, and much more expensive: the returns fail to meet the bills. And tomorrow, there won't be any returns at all: India isn't going to pay any more English bills.

Wastelands

What is there to show for this tremendous expenditure of human energy and treasure? What, I mean, did the body of people of England and the body of people of India, get out of all this?

They got a whole lot of what has eventually turned out to be rather senseless and often tragically senseless activity, of large and complicated but often meaningless and fruitless movement. Men and materials were always being moved from one place to another, and often changed from one name or form to another—but to what end?

Indians were taken from the weaving of their marvelous cotton and silk textiles for which they had great natural genius, and were set to growing cotton instead, and then all this cotton was carried on a great many boats half-way round the globe to England, where it was turned into millions of yards of rather dreadful stuff in big hideous factories with which England had darkened her once tenderly beautiful countryside, and millions of Englishmen were obliged to live dreadful lives in these dreadful factories to make this dreadful stuff, and then the millions of yards of it were put on a great many more boats and sent half-way round the globe back to India, where the Indian people, who hated the stuff, had to buy it. The Indian who grew the cotton and the Englishman who had to turn it into cloth, *both* got miserable wages and fairly miserable lives for their pains. And even the imperially-minded men who directed all these complicated operations, even they did not have so very much fun, either; they had to keep the sea route to India under their control, and that meant grabbing and holding lands that belonged to other people, and that meant wars, and they always had to be bothered about the possibility of mutiny in India, and of India being taken away from them, and of places on the route to India, which is a lot of places, being taken away from them, and they always had to be bothered knowing that the people of India and of all these other places hated them, and they had to pretend they didn't know they hated them, and they had to sleep with one eye open, and so they did not sleep well, and they did not really get a very good life out of the possession of India, either.

What is there to show for all these terrific imperial goings-on? In India: the largest body of the poorest people under one of the most autocratic governments on earth. But even in England, in the democratic homeland

itself, what is there to show? Did the masses of English people, did the individual Englishman and Englishwoman, permanently gain anything real or good, by this long connexion? They did not. Industrial conditions in England, as is notorious, have been the worst in all Europe, characterized by slums in days of plenty, and in lean days by the wasteland of distressed areas and the indignity of the dole.

Who gained by the connexion? In fact, nobody. The whole connexion has been one of the most regrettable and wasteful episodes of history. On the English side, not a single great thing has come out of it, not a single great book, poem, song or picture. One great person has emerged from it, Jawaharlal Nehru, to whom England no less than India might point with pride: instead England imprisons and wastes him, imprisoning and wasting the best of herself.

A great idea has grown out of the connexion, but it is an Indian idea, and it is concerned wholly with the breaking of the connexion. This is Gandhi's idea of non-violent resistance to misrule—the idea for which he is imprisoned—the idea which the British are now recommending to other dominated people to break the rule of the Axis . . .

England could not "afford" to give up India, Mr. Churchill once explained to America, because "two out of every ten Englishmen depend on India." (Others say eight out of ten.) Exactly what does Mr. Churchill mean by "depend"? It is an unfortunate word, especially if true: why should any Englishman have to depend on India? What's wrong with Englishmen that they should have to depend on anything or anybody but themselves? Isn't this rather a humiliating confession?

Although we accept this statement seriously, think how very preposterous we should find it if Japan said that it

could not afford to give up China, because two out of every ten Japanese depended on China?

The English catastrophe-complex in regard to India has also been completely expressed by Mr. Churchill in these words: "The loss of India, however arising, would be final and fatal to us. It could not fail to be part of a process which would reduce us to the scale of a minor power." With all due regard for Mr. Churchill's great gifts and great services to his country, that type of thought is of course just economic dodoism. The loss of India would be neither a loss nor final nor fatal. Other states, major as well as minor, survive nobly without "depending" on India—why not England? Englishmen must get over this strangely muddled emotionalism that makes them fear that if England is "reduced"—a comparatively offensive word—to the status of the other states of the world, it would mean the end of England and the end of the world. It wouldn't.

It would simply mean that there would be considerably less foxhunting pink on world maps, and not so many British clubs in so many foreign lands which natives may not enter. It would mean that not so many retired British colonels could live on the Riviera on their Indian pensions. It would mean that Britons would no longer be able to take enough wealth out of a subcontinent like India, to buy the control of another subcontinent like Argentina, thus disgearing all relations on both continents. It would mean a reduction in the scale of living of a very few English families and a constriction of their international financial activities.

But to the masses of people of Britain, the "loss" of India would mean an enormous relief that that headache was over and done with. Their pre-war scale of living was largely on the dole level. If the planned economy of wartime, which eliminated unemployment and raised the

standard of living and health, is continued after the peace, a relocation of English economy can be successfully carried out.

With the independence of India, the forms of English economy will necessarily undergo a change. If the break is settled peacefully, the transition period can be so adjusted and so extended that England's economy need suffer no shock: it can continue in the direction of the more balanced economy already planned and begun during the war. Free India will certainly not immediately break all her trade relations with England, but will only gradually lessen them. During the transition period, England will have time to make other connections, undertake other activities. From an extensive economy, she may have to turn to an intensive one, from superficial development of large world areas to thorough development of smaller world areas.

Freed of the burden of responsibility for the four hundred million people of a foreign subcontinent, able English administrators will be able to turn their talents to the long-neglected mother country and the undeveloped dominions. English finance-capital, what there is left of it after the war, may for a beneficent change be invested at home for the social and other services of the English people, even if the returns are not quite so multiple as when invested abroad. Like Midas, England has found that one cannot eat gold nor foreign investments; one must sell them to eat, and in an emergency like war one may have to sell at a loss that may offset all previous gains.

Post-war, India-free England must arrange first of all to be able to feed herself with at least basic foods in the event of war. She may have to beat some of those black old Lancashire factories back into the real gold of wheat fields. She may have to give up her soft but dull life as

the world's ubiquitous insurance agent and banking clerk, and dig into a job of real work at home. If there are too many Britishers per square mile for Britain, they at least have an advantage over most Europeans: they have whole continental areas of their own freely to emigrate to, Canada and Australia and South Africa, as well as the United States.

Within this vast and powerful English-speaking combination, Britain would certainly not be reduced to the scale of a very minor power.

Responsibility to Britain

In this whole question, the United States, as a member of the United Nations fighting for a New World Order, has a responsibility to Britain no less than to India. We have made our position on Indian freedom fairly clear. President Roosevelt has repeatedly stated that there is no place in the modern world for feudal imperialisms. Vice-President Wallace has said, "the new democracy by definition abhors imperialism." Mr. Sumner Welles has said that "both isolationism and the strange doctrine of incipient 'bear-the-white-man's-burden' imperialism would prove equally dangerous to the future well-being of our nation." Mr. Willkie has spoken unequivocally on the subject.

It is noteworthy that it was to us, and not to the Axis, that Mr. Churchill felt moved to reply, "We mean to hold our own."

Nevertheless, like India who have offered to accept additional financial burdens for the sake of freedom without bloodshed, we too are willing to extend our aid to England, for we know that it will cost us all infinitely less than extricating England from World War III. The standard of living of all of us will rise together or fall

together. Asia will no longer permit us to use her as the raw materials base on which to erect a high living level for ourselves alone. If the coming peace does not equalize conditions, the next war will. Our aid then goes not to subsidize imperial England to maintain the Old World Order, but to help democratic England create with us the New World Order.

First of all, we should make it quite clear to England that we have no intention of muscling into the trade of India behind her back. England undoubtedly suspects us, and with reason. After all, Standard Oil did get away with the Saudi Arabia oil contract in the Middle East which England has always regarded as her private oil poaching grounds. On the other hand, England cannot expect her monopoly control of Indian trade to go on forever.

Secondly, full facilities of Lend-Lease should be offered to tide England over during the post-war transition period, especially in regard to Lancashire.

Thirdly, in cooperation with Britain and other United Nations, we must coordinate world trade: rationalize it, taylorize it, streamline it on assembly lines in continental areas, with no waste motions back and forth over lands and seas.

Fourthly, let us support New World Order Englishmen: they need it. Let us ask their support: we need it. Let us not become "sensitive" to each other's criticism. We shall need each other in our common fight against the gentlemen of the Old World Order, Axis and Allied.

It is being asked in certain quarters whether Britain can afford to live without the padded cushioning of India. The answer is: NOT in the style to which the Old World Order had accustomed her. But: Britain can live as well as all other countries will have to live in the New World Order, not as the one power above all others, but as one

among many great powers. Where will this leave England?

It will leave her temporarily in a superficial economic jam, which we shall all share alike. But it will leave her permanently relieved of her self-inflicted masochistic imperial cross, which she has so long and bravely and painfully and deludedly and unnecessarily borne. The world will be cured of its major economic and political derangement, and England will enjoy a healthier, happier and saner life than she has had in centuries.

(If the people of the West could only "get" Gandhi, it might make the problem of India clearer to them. The simplest of men, he is yet the hardest to make clear, perhaps because we ourselves have become twisted into so many artificial knots, that we no longer understand simplicity. At a dinner in honor of Gandhi's birthday in October 1940 the following speech was given.)

CHAPTER SEVEN

Gandhi and the Spinning Wheel

"America and Britain are very great nations, but their greatness will count as dust before the bar of dumb humanity, whether African or Asiatic. They and they alone have the power to undo the wrong. They have no right to talk of human liberty and all else, unless they have washed their hands clean of the pollution . . . Since America has become the predominant partner in the Allied cause, she is partner also in Britain's guilt. The Allies have no right to hold their cause to be morally superior to the Nazi cause, so long as they hold in custody one of the most ancient nations of the earth."

Gandhi, *My Appeal to the British*.

Organization of Values

I wonder whether any of you has had time to read a book by the poet T. S. Eliot, called *The Idea of a Christian Society*. The title may seem remote from current events, but it is a timely book. Mr. Eliot writes:

"I believe there must be many persons who, like myself, were deeply shaken by the events of September 1938 (Munich), in a way from which one does not recover; persons to whom that month brought a profounder realization of a general plight . . . the feeling which was new and unexpected was a feeling of humiliation, which seemed to demand an act of personal contrition, of humility, repentance and amendment; what had happened was something in which one was deeply implicated and res-

possible. It was not a criticism of the government, but a doubt of the validity of a civilization . . .

"Was our society, which had always been so assured of its superiority and rectitude, so confident of its unexamined premises, assembled round anything more permanent than a congeries of banks, insurance companies and industries, and had it any beliefs more essential than a belief in compound interest and the maintenance of dividends? . . ."

"What I am concerned with," continues Mr. Eliot, "is not spiritual institutions . . . but the organization of values, and a direction of religious thought which must inevitably proceed to a criticism of political and economic systems . . .

"What—if any—is the 'idea' of the society in which we live? . . .

"We may say that religion, as distinguished from modern paganism, implies a life in conformity with nature . . . and that a wrong attitude towards nature implies, somewhere, a wrong attitude towards God, and the consequence is an inevitable doom . . .

"My primary interest is a change in our social attitude. . .

"The life of virtue is the purpose of human society."*

So speaks Mr. Eliot, the Anglo-American poet.

There is only one political leader in the world today who speaks likewise—who not only speaks, but acts, like a member of a Christian Society—and that one is neither an Englishman nor an American nor a Christian—he is an Asiatic, an Indian, and a Hindu, he is Gandhi, in honor of whose good life and good works we have met here tonight.

Gandhi has devoted his life to one simple great aim: to make Indians free without killing Englishmen. We all

* From *The Idea of a Christian Society* (Harcourt, Brace & Company).

know that one day India will be free. When? How? Now by peace? Or too late by war? Gandhi believes, and many people in England as well as India agree, that freedom for India now, by peaceful methods, would be the best thing that could happen to India, to England, and to the world.

It is very difficult to discuss India at any time, but particularly now when London is under fire—without appearing to be brutal, without running the risk of being classed among Archibald MacLeish's "Irresponsibles."

Repudiation of the Old Forms

"Wars," wrote Mr. MacLeish, "we have had before—many wars: murder also: inquisition of scholars: torture of askers: suppression and mutilation of truth. But in the past these things have been done, *however hypocritically*, in the name of truth, in the name of humanity—even in the name of God. The *forms* of culture were preserved—and in the preservation of a civilization as in the preservation of an art, *the forms are everything*. What is new and unexampled in the times we live in is the *repudiation of the forms*. What is new is a cynical brutality which . . . dispenses even with the filthy garment of the hypocrite."* (My italics.)

I am afraid that to discuss India intelligently in the terms of the living world, I too shall be obliged to dispense with the filthy garment of the hypocrite. I shall—and this is more serious—be obliged to repudiate certain forms of so-called culture. I cannot agree with Mr. MacLeish that in the preservation of a civilization or of art, the forms are *everything*: I believe that forms are important, that forms are essential, but more important than the forms are the meanings behind the forms . . . are the life that these forms create—or the death, for when forms outlive themselves, they kill life. There comes a time when certain

* From *The Irresponsibles* (Duell, Sloane & Pearce, Inc.).

forms must be broken and remolded, when new forms must be created. And with these new forms must come new words, or a new interpretation of old words.

Mr. MacLeish was deeply disturbed because the young generation distrusted words: "all statements of principle, and all declarations of moral purpose."

Edmund Wilson explained why: "Words," he said, "are a medium and a technique for putting on record the realities of human experience, a medium and a technique which must constantly be renewed to meet the requirements of changing experience. The truth is that when the new words come in, the old must be put away; and it is one of the primary duties of the writer to avoid using outworn words that no longer have any real meaning."

New words have come in concerning India, and the old ones must be put away.

You will understand, then, why I cannot usefully speak to you about India in such terms as the "brightest jewel of the British Crown." That phrase is still being used by the British government and the American press. The phrase still has form—it no longer has meaning—it no longer has life—it must be repudiated.

The facts are these, and they are neither bright nor jewel-like: India is the consummated precedent for all the political crimes that are being committed today. Wars, murder, inquisition of scholars, torture of askers, suppression and mutilation of truth, have been, and are being committed in India—in the name of God—the God of England. They are the precedent for the wars, murders, etc., that are being committed in other parts of the world—in the name of the Gods of Germany, Italy, Japan.

Mr. Winston Churchill, before he became Prime Minister, said: "We have no intention whatever of relinquishing effectual control of Indian life; we have no intention of casting away that most truly bright and precious

jewel in the Crown of the King, which, more than all our other dominions and dependencies, constitutes the glory and strength of the British Empire."

So when Japan decides that China is to be the most truly bright jewel in the Crown of the Japanese King-Emperor, or when Hitler decides that Poland and France are to constitute the glory and strength of the German Empire, India is the moral precedent for their claims.

But—does India really constitute the glory and strength of the British Empire? It constitutes perhaps the loot and the booty—but the real glory and strength of the British Empire lies rather in the rhythm of Mr. Churchill's prose—(though not always in its sense)—in the poetry of its poets, and in the wisdom of its honorable men who believed in freedom not only for themselves but for all other men.

I cannot usefully speak to you in terms of the "legal rights" of British rule in India—as did a recent Foreign Policy Report on India, which stated in its conclusion: "By declaring India a belligerent without consultation of Indian leaders, the British government—*while acting within its legal rights*—committed a psychological blunder, and provoked resentment and criticism in India and elsewhere." Because, blunders or no blunders, there are no legal rights to British rule in India: there are only legal *wrongs*: there is only legality based on conquest.

If there be legal right to British rule in India, then there is likewise legal right to German rule in Poland, to Italian rule in Abyssinia, to Japanese rule in China. Then—what are we fighting this war about?

One cannot dismiss this by saying, "But why bring that up—the British conquest was two hundred years ago. Why rehash the past?" Simply because the past is the cause of the present—one reason why German bombs are falling on London tonight is because British bombs fell

on the Northwest Frontier last year. If an act is evil for one year, then it is not any better for lasting two hundred years ; it is, if anything, two hundred times more evil.

Or, if with skeptical cynicism, one accepts the consequences of evil acts that are two hundred years old, then again why need we fight the dictators now ? We need only go quietly to bed—and two hundred years later their conquests will be as legal as ours.

Nor can I usefully speak to you in the words of one of our most erudite columnists, Walter Lippmann, when he writes that the constitution which the British government granted India is a symptom of democracy within the British commonwealth. It is impossible for anything which a conqueror "grants" to a conquered people against its will, by armed force, to be a symptom of democracy—that is a complete contradiction of terms, which can only lead to further confusion in our thinking and to lunacy in our acting. This constitution—which few of our democratic columnists who praise it, have taken the trouble to read—erects the most complex and complicated political structure in the world—at the very top of which sits a Single Foreigner who has the exclusive right to say NO to anybody about anything of any importance at any time. But the details of this constitution do not matter—it is already dead and gone. What does matter—and I should like to stress this, for it is basic in what I am trying to say—is that we who call ourselves democrats should clearly realize that the only people who have the democratic right to grant a constitution to India are the Indian people.

And finally, I cannot usefully speak to you in the manner of the London *Economist*, which stated that it was "surprised and bewildered" at the "tactics" of the Indian National Congress in demanding independence, and that the Congress was being "fatally misled" by two things :—

the (1940) "unhappy visit" of Sir Stafford Cripps, and the publication of John Gunther's "Inside Asia," which, according to this article, has convinced American opinion that Jawaharlal Nehru is a "kind of Asiatic demi-god."

Now you and I know that the *Economist* is neither surprised nor bewildered: the *Economist* knows damned well what this is all about. Yet in the year 1940, in the midst of the most convulsive world revolution, regarding the most pressing problem in the British Empire, all that the *Economist*, perhaps the most influential paper of the Empire, can publicly offer to its readers as an explanation of the situation, are these pathetic and irresponsible trivialities.

The basic fact is that the demand of India for independence is not an artificial tactic based on a visit or a book, but a natural national impulse that can no more be stemmed than a normal tidal wave. Facing the problem so, on a basis of reality, one can proceed to real solutions; and not otherwise.

All these meaningless phrases have built up a *form*, a concept of India that has no relation to reality, and that makes no sense: the brightest jewel in the crown of democratic England, is a country where English conquerors have the legal right to force the people to fight for the freedom of other people—and to imprison and execute them when they fight for their own freedom.

The British applaud themselves, and we applaud them, when they say they will die fighting for freedom rather than submit to German domination. But when Indians want to fight for their freedom rather than submit to British domination, the British deplore it deeply—they say it would be taking advantage of the British and therefore dishonorable. When Indians remind them that it was by consistently and dishonorably and outrageously taking advantage of the Indian people for many years, that the

British succeeded in conquering them, they are told not to rake up the unpleasant past. When Indians say, very well, let bygones be bygones, and let us have liberty now, the British say no, not now, some other time. For 25 years now the British have been saying no, some other time . . . Meantime, say the British, you must fight for the liberty of the British and the Czechs and the Poles and the Dutch—but not your own—if you try to fight for your own liberty, you go to jail—or you die.

I have intentionally refrained from giving you any figures—reports of arrests, strikes, violence, repression, etc., which have seeped through the British censorship via the underground grape-vine—the huge sums of money Britain takes out of India every year, the enormous salaries of the British officials, the vast expenditures for armies of occupation—the result of which is that there is very little left for the education and the health of the people so that 9 out of 10 cannot read or write, and all may expect to die at an average age of 26—when most of us democrats expect to begin to live.

These figures matter a great deal, but not basically to what I am trying to say. For even if every Indian lived to be a hundred, and the average annual wage was \$1500 instead of \$15, the British domination of India would still be a bad thing.

For the same reason, I shall not go into an elaborate discussion of the rationalizations which the British offer for the continuance of their dictatorship, the three big black bogeys: the Muslim bogey, the Princes bogey, and the Invaders bogey. Actually British rule does not solve these three problems: on the contrary, it is worsening and perpetuating them. If Indian wealth were used for Indian life, for Indian education, health, pleasure, agricultural and industrial development—instead of being “legally” looted by the British—these problems in a free,

prosperous, independent India would normally solve themselves. The friction between the Hindus and Muslims, which are due to ignorance and poverty, would disappear, just as friction between Catholics and Protestants has disappeared. The Indian princes rule about a third of India as the most absolute feudal autocrats in the world, *only* by British support. All efforts on the part of the Congress leaders to introduce democracy into the native states are balked less by the princes, than by the British, who purposely keep them feudal. India's vast population and enormous natural resources could easily produce and equip a national army fit to protect it from any attack. In the last war, the Indians furnished an army of a million and a quarter men, provided over one billion dollars' worth of supplies, and contributed almost another billion in financial support—for the Empire. If they could do that for their conquerors, they could do infinitely more for themselves. True, some Indians may not want to be free of England. Some Americans didn't, in 1776. Some Frenchmen don't want to be free of Germany now. Such citizens in the long run don't count.

But even if all this were not so—even if there were to be serious difficulties on all these three issues—there would still be no decent reason for Britain to continue its dictatorship over India. No decent reason exists. No Christian Democratic Our-Way-of-Life reason.

We have all been doing a very great deal of talking and writing of late about Our Way of Life, Our Democracy, etc. This all sounds very noble in the abstract. In the concrete, what does it come to? This:

That in order to defend Our Way of Life: We must have a seven-ocean navy. We must control the sea power and air power of the world. We must have military and naval and air bases not only in the United States but also all over North America, Central America, South America,

Africa, and Asia. We must also share the British naval base in Singapore in order to defend Our Way of Life against the Japanese. (Suppose Japan said that in order to defend Her Way of Life, she had to have a naval base in Lower California?)

But we do not really achieve our Way of Life by taking more and more military power—and with it more and more economic wealth—by dominating more and more seas, and with them the lives of more and more peoples living on those seas—or by making speeches about our Manifest Destiny to control the world. What difference is there between that and the totalitarian belief in their Manifest Destiny to control the world? None—except that we think we are better—but that is a unilateral opinion. We may believe in the virtues of democracy for ourselves—but until we believe in them for other peoples too, *and until we act on that belief*, our talk about our Christian Democratic way of life will convince no one—least of all ourselves. Our talk will still remain the meaningless patter of an outlived form.

Will to Power by Love

Within India, at all events, the old forms have been repudiated, and new forms have taken their place. Gandhi, and with him Nehru and all India, have been building these new forms over a long period of years. They are framed by freedom and equality and friendship and co-operation. They are based on certain Gandhian principles of non-violent political action.

Gandhi believes in the political power of the will to love. He believes that the will to love is more powerful than—or at least as powerful as—the will to hate or the will to dominate.

His belief in this power of love is so simple and so

extraordinary that it is hard to convey to western minds without apparent absurdity.

Gandhi believes that it is not necessary for individuals or nations to fear or hate each other, if they would only forgive each other for sins of the past, and if they would only act toward each other with love in their hearts and in their minds. If they did so, he believes that they would not need to wage wars against each other, and so create more sins and more fear and more hate and more war. This vicious circle of sin and fear and hate and war he believes can be broken by the power of the will to love. This will to love must be felt and expressed so fully and strongly and imaginatively and actively, that the ego and pride and real vital interests of other nations—even enemy nations—are held as precious as one's own.

He believes that personal behavior should be pure, in the sense that it is free from hate or fear or envy or greed, and he believes that political behavior should be just as pure as personal behavior. His is.

He does not hate anyone, not even Mr. Churchill who has behaved grossly against him. He forgives the English for the very great wrongs they have done to his people for so long. He loves what he finds good in the English, and tries by his own behavior to evoke this latent goodness in them.

For a quarter of a century he has led a revolution of his people against their English rulers and although they have imprisoned him and his people and often treated them with great cruelty, he has not hated the English. He has never lied to them, he has never concealed anything from them, and he has never retaliated with their methods of cruelty or espionage or violence. He has always forgiven them and loved them—not because they were lovable, but because his will to love was so great as to overcome the obstacles they set before it.

He believes that the will to love can be strong enough to overcome all obstacles, even an opposing will to rule and dominate. He believes that the Indian will to love should be able, in friendship, to persuade the English will-to-rule-and-dominate India to cease ruling and dominating India—without having to go through the savagery of waging war.

If the Gandhi method of war-by-love should succeed—if India wins its freedom without resort to war-by-arms—it would mean an incalculable rise in human stature, and in the development of human society. For the first time in history, man would have fought and won his freedom from his enemy-man by friendship. If it should fail, it will at least have been one of the most heroic attempts ever made by man to rise above his animal ancestry, and to act like his own concept of God.

Tough Love

Gandhi is not original in teaching the power of love. All religious leaders teach love. "Ama, et fac quod vis," said St. Augustine: love, and do what thou wilt. "Love thy neighbor as thyself," said Jesus, and Buddha said that hatred ceased only by love.

What is original about Gandhi is that he is not only a great religious but also a great political leader, and that he has taken religion out of the church and put it into the public forum, into the market place, into life. He has put ethics into practical politics. To Gandhi politics is not "dirty." It is the organized communal activity of men made in the image of their god, and partakes therefore of the nature of god, or goodness.

To understand Gandhi, read Buddha, Hindu Scripture, Confucius, Lin Yutang, Nehru ; also read Gandhi. In the western world, you will find inklings of his spirit now

stirring in the writings of Aldous Huxley, T. S. Eliot, Edmund Wilson, Anne Lindbergh, Alexander Meiklejohn, and rather strangely, in Antoine de Saint Exupéry, who wrote, "What we are when motionless is the question"—one of the most revolutionary thoughts ever expressed in our modern western world of ceaseless motion. Many of Saint Exupéry's lines could have been written by Gandhi: "To know is not to prove, not to explain. It is to accede to vision . . . I reject non-being. My purpose is to be. And if I am to be, I must begin by assuming responsibility . . . Victory is the fruit of love . . ."*

There is nothing soft in this Gandhian line. It would be dangerously delusory to mistake it for mere passivity. To forgive your enemy in the active Gandhian sense requires a stupendous act of will. Try it and see. It is far easier to kill your enemy than to forgive him. Gandhian love is tough as tempered steel, much tougher than brittle Vansittartish hate for instance, which it will survive. It has the quality of endurance of the elements.

New Forms : Naïve

Against the whole vast structure of British imperial power, Gandhi has pitted himself in repudiation of the ancient form, armed only with a spinning wheel and love : material for new forms.

The spinning wheel has become the symbol of the fight for Indian independence. Weaving their own cloth, or khaddar, Indians could refuse to buy British cloth, and so challenge British industrial domination. Around the spinning wheel, they could create their own village industries and develop political village institutions. Gandhi does not repudiate modern industrialization in toto, as is

* Quotations from *Flight to Arras* (Reynal & Hitchcock).

often alleged. He simply believes that all of India does not need to be turned into factories, and that hand industries also have their place in modern society. We are all now turning to the same view. Far from being reactionary, Gandhi was as usual in advance of his time. His cottage industries have been of enormous importance in the Indian war effort.*

But beyond its mere practical importance, the spinning wheel has grown to be the symbol of the Gandhian idea of revolution or change by love and reason, as opposed to the idea of change by force. A few Indian leaders like Bose have given up hope in the efficacy of the Gandhian principle ; Nehru and most others still stand by it, although they know the power of force in the modern world. In prison and out, the Indian Congress spins . . . New methods of warfare and destruction come and go. Conquests and Viceroys and King-Emperors come and go. But the spinning wheel, one of man's most elementary machines, created not to destroy but to produce, it remains. Gandhi dares to juxtapose his little spinning wheel to our gigantic war machines, and to ask, Which shall survive?

Sometimes, thinking of Gandhi with his loin cloth and his little spinning wheel standing up to the British Empire, and then thinking of the British Empire, of the huge India Office in London, and the huge British secretariat in Delhi, thinking of the British army, and the great British navy, and the very great Bank of England—I have thought: Isn't he naïve—isn't the whole idea naïve?

Yes, it is naïve.

Yet—in politics, as in art, there comes a period when sophistication ties itself up into so many knots and complications and dead-ends—when the forms of culture bear

* Described in the Appendix, "Lend-Lease in India."

so little relation to the real life of the people—that there is only one way out:

One must break the forms. One must go back to first principles. One must, whether one prefers it or not, become naïve, to find the truth again.

That in its essence is perhaps the secret of Gandhi's great power. In this complex modern world of giant industries and colossal armament plants, his little spinning wheel, his little salt march to the sea, his loin-cloth, words about love and peace—they are naïve—yet they are perhaps more powerful than our most powerful flying fortresses, because they are in the long run indestructible.

(Gandhi is the essence of the wisdom of the East, not readily understandable to the West. But in Nehru, East and West have met. A speech delivered at a dinner held in honor of Nehru's birthday, 14 November 1942, follows.)

CHAPTER EIGHT

Nehru and Guns

"I stand before you, sir, as an individual being tried for certain offences against the State. You are a symbol of that State. But I am something more than an individual also ; I, too, am a symbol at the present moment, a symbol of Indian nationalism, resolved to break away from the British Empire and achieve the independence of India. It is not me that you are seeking to judge and condemn, but rather the hundreds of millions of the people of India, and that is a large task even for a proud Empire. Perhaps it may be that, though I am standing before you on my trial, it is the British Empire itself that is on its trial before the bar of the world."

Nehru's statement at his trial, *The Unity of India*.

India's Secret Weapon

The Cripps mission, although it failed, achieved one successful result : this was not the purpose of the mission, it was an unforeseen but very important by-product of it. It brought to India newspaper men and women in large numbers from many parts of the world, and it subjected them to India's secret weapon, one of the most powerful weapons of the United Nations in this war, the political mind of Jawaharlal Nehru. I call it secret because many of us don't know of its existence (and certain others who do know are trying to keep it secret from the rest of us). But those who have experienced it personally, know its power. No journalist who has had the privilege of an

interview with Jawaharlal Nehru has ever come out of it the same man. Sometimes he doesn't know for a long time exactly what has happened to him, but one thing is certain: the world will never look like quite the same old Anglo-American crazy-quilt again.

What Nehru does to our political thinking is as revolutionary as the effect Galileo had on people's geographical thinking a few centuries ago. People, you remember, used to think the earth was flat, and they had a natural tendency to believe that the center of the universe was the spot where they happened to be; so it was rather hard for them to take Galileo's word for it that the earth was round and that centers were relative to the whole sphere. Today certain people still believe that the earth is politically flat, and that its central address is No. 10 Downing Street; and it is extremely difficult for them to swallow Nehru's teaching that the earth is politically no less than geographically round, and that it must be comprehended and politically grasped in the round and as a whole.

Now I know you are expecting me to say something personal about Nehru tonight—that is my assignment—and I have found it rather an odd one to cover, because Nehru is one of the most impersonal persons in the world. His impersonality is perhaps his most outstanding personal characteristic—and his detachment is another. These are qualities he has achieved by years of self-discipline over a nature that was originally impulsive, high-spirited and individualistic. He is one of the few public figures in the world who are honored and loved with equal enthusiasm and devotion not only by men and women alike, but alike by people of the East and of the West, perhaps because they see in him a new type of individual, a natural synthesis of the best of the old and new worlds—a global-minded man, waging global peace. (Of whom Clare Luce could say that he was global without being baloney.)

He has certain rare qualities, rare only in the sense that good bread for some reason is rare. He is, for instance, a normal human being ; he is not exaggerated ; there is proportion and harmony in him. He does not remind one, as most people do, of any animal : as Mussolini reminded Churchill of a jackal, and as Churchill reminds everybody of a bulldog. He makes one think rather that this is what nature may have had in mind when it set out evolving human beings, before the pattern somehow went astray. When he enters a room, he neither dominates it, nor is dominated by it ; rather, he expands it, and everybody in it. There is a spaciousness about him, and in his presence trivial things tend to disappear, and good ideas to become alive, urgent, and possible. Quite normally, he loves laughter, people, nature, life ; he enjoys sports, he rides, skis, climbs, flies ; he reads enormously, and happens to write greatly.

His career is modern. He did sciences, especially chemistry, at Cambridge, read law at the Inner Temple, became mayor of his home town, Allahabad, was twice elected President of the Indian Congress party, and has written many of its great documents, as Jefferson did for the American Revolution. He has taken part in peasants and trades-union organizations, and arbitrated labor-industry disputes for great Indian firms like the Tata Steel Works. All this, of course, between English prison terms which have dissipated a dozen years of his adult life. The greatest job of his career, the chairmanship of the All Indian National Planning Committee, was cut off by the war and renewed imprisonment. (If the Nehru Committee's plans for industrialization had been put into effect, it could have saved the United States millions in Lend-Lease materials.)

His *Glimpses of World History*, written in prison, might well serve as a world text-book for A.M.G. ; it redresses

the balance of the anglo-centric interpretation. He has made studies of military strategy, techniques of revolution, national and international economic planning. He is not so much a politician as a technician in politics. Indeed, one of the paradoxes of the Anglo-Indian situation today is that England is led by an 18th century orator, and India by a 21st century political scientist.

Nehru's unbroken allegiance to Gandhi is one of the strongest factors in Indian political power. Countless British attempts to divide them—by balancing one against the other, by alternately favoring first one, then the other—have all failed. Nehru's impatient modernity may strain at the great Mahatma's slower pace, but he knows the abiding value of loyalty, continuity, and the indivisible front. The British would give the eye-teeth of the Empire to divide these two men, but they never will.

Nehru's public career has developed without fear, without reproach, and without appeasement. He is a trusted friend of long standing, and not of expediency, of China, Russia, and the liberals of Europe. His undeviating integrity has had its own unsought reward. Despite the silence and inactivity which imprisonment enforces, he has become to an extraordinary degree one of the world's most popular figures in this war. His autobiography, *Toward Freedom*, and his later books, *China, Spain and the War*, and *The Unity of India*, are read by modern-minded men and women all over the world. He has become a symbol of that new world order which all men of good will everywhere wish to see established.

Northwest Frontier

Luckily Nehru was out of prison the year John Gunther and I were in India. It was 1938, the year before the war broke out, when correspondents in India could still move

about with a certain degree of freedom. I should like to tell you one incident in our experience there—or rather, three incidents that make three facades of a single story, in only one of which Nehru was present, but all of which he, and the India he stands for, pervaded.

The place where the first incident occurred was Peshawar in the Northwest Frontier province, the fabled Kipling country of the Khyber Pass—you remember, where East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet—the country of the unconquerable Pathan frontier tribesmen.

Nehru was then President of the Indian National Congress, and it was in that year that the Congress won the elections and took office under the India Act of 1935. He had come up to Peshawar for conferences with the Congress Prime Minister, and addressed a great outdoor mass meeting *on the outskirts of the town*.

That evening Nehru said to me, "Tomorrow morning, Abdul Gaffar Khan and I are going to Kohat where we are having a Congress meeting, and on the way down we'll stop and visit the Afridi tribal villages. Why don't you come along with us?"

To visit the fabled Northwest Frontier tribesmen in the company of their great chief, Abdul Gaffar Khan, and Nehru, President of the Indian Congress, was, of course, an unprecedented opportunity for any reporter, and so I telegraphed John Gunther, who had already left Peshawar, that I would meet him a day later in Delhi.

When I arrived early next morning at the house of Dr. Khan, Prime Minister of the province, where Nehru and Abdul Gaffar Khan were staying, the grounds were covered with many hundreds of Indians who had come to pay their respects and have a word with their Congress leader. Most of them, of course, were Muslims. The Northwest Frontier is 92 per cent Muslim ; but it had voted

overwhelmingly for the Muslim candidates of the Congress party and elected a Congress government.

We drove off in a Model-T Ford chauffeured by its owner, a young local Muslim tradesman obviously proud of his unusual privilege. Beside him sat two of Abdul Gaffar Khan's young men. Abdul Gaffar Khan, next to Gandhi and Nehru, is one of the country's most loved leaders, and physically one of the most magnificent specimens of the human race in India or any other country, for that matter. He stands 6 feet 3, with the head of a Roman emperor, eagle's nose, steady-eyed, powerful and calm. He wore a white wool scarf and was bareheaded.

Nehru wore his habitual Congress cap and only a light coat made of khaddar, or homespun cloth. It was a clear, blue, cold day in January in the mountains, and I huddled in my fur coat to keep warm as we drove through high mountain passes in the open car. Observing their unconcern as the wind whipped through their light clothing, I said, trying to keep my teeth from chattering, "I thought Indians couldn't stand the cold." Abdul Gaffar Khan smiled, "Oh, you have been hearing the English fairy tales about us." But Nehru confessed in a stage aside, "I am not really as warm as I pretend to be, but I can't let on before Abdul Gaffar Khan—he goes through any weather in a scarf." This was Nehru's first trip through this part of the Northwest frontier also ; he was in high spirits and talked and laughed light-heartedly—as though he had never been in an English prison, and did not know that he would soon return to one again.

Non-violent Guns

About 20 minutes out of Peshawar, I was suddenly startled by shots from the roadside. "Gee, what's that?" I said curiously. They both laughed. The car slowed

down. "Look," said Nehru, "these are Abdul Gaffar Khan's famous Red Shirts." On both sides of the road were lined up rows of tall, fine-looking young men, erect and soldierly, shooting into the air, saluting the car as it went by. They did not all wear red shirts, but they all wore something red—scarf, cap or leg binding—not because red is a revolutionary or Communist color or even because it is the color of the British Empire on maps, but simply because the cheapest local vegetable dye makes red.

The lineup and the shooting of guns in salutation continued at a few hundred yard intervals, all along our five-hour route. This, I thought, was as good as a New York motorcycle welcome to a returning hero from the Battery to the Plaza—only much longer and much more significant.

Some of the shooting was simply popshots from fire crackers. But many of the groups of young men had real guns—and they fired them into the air with competent pride.

"Where did they get these guns?" I asked.

"Our men make their guns themselves," Abdul Gaffar Khan explained. "It is an old tradition amongst our Pathan tribesmen. They have been making their own guns for generations."

"Don't the British mind?" I asked.

"What can they do?" he countered.

As we spoke, I recalled a trip I had taken only a few days before—this time accompanied by a British official who had actually shown me the gun factories of Abdul Gaffar Khan's tribesmen. I had watched them planing wood, boring holes, adjusting sights. I had asked the British official, "Where do they get their materials?" He explained, "You see, we give them the stuff and we let them make these guns here—it keeps them occupied and

happy, and above all, it keeps them from trying underground methods of getting guns through Afghanistan from the Germans or the Russians—" (in 1938, you remember, Russia was still the Bear that walked like a man in India across the Khyber Pass). "The foreign guns might be dangerous, but these guns they make here are pretty harmless compared to real guns, and they only last a few months. But it keeps them busy and,"—he finished, smiling in a reassuring, kindly way,—“after all, the Indians are just children, you know.”

Although I said nothing about this now, Abdul Gaffar Khan said, as if easily following my thoughts, "Of course, the British pretend to help us make our guns. They think that if we make these little guns here we won't know anything about getting real guns from people who offer them to us abroad—and they think that it takes our minds off the real issue of independence—after all, the British are just children, you know."

(It was here that I began to wonder: Maybe we are all just children, you know . . . That thesis could explain a great deal in international politics.)

"But how," I asked Nehru, "does this fit in with your theory of non-violence? Abdul Gaffar Khan here is supposed to be Gandhi's most devoted and disciplined follower. Why, then, all these guns?"

Nehru replied, "It is true that one of the reasons that we have adopted non-violence as our weapon in our fight for independence is that we have no other weapon. We have been totally disarmed since 1857—it is a criminal offense for a man to possess a big knife in India. But that reason is only one of expediency, and is not the basis of the Gandhi principle of non-violence. Gandhi believes that even though we possessed the greatest weapons in the world, the biggest tanks, planes, and guns, still we should not use them. He believes that justice and love

and reason are more powerful than the strongest mechanized forces. That is why Abdul Gaffar Khan trains his men to shoot—and then disciplines them to have the power not to shoot."

"That," I said, "is very hard for a western mind to understand."

"I suppose it is," he said.

"Do you believe in it yourself?" I said.

"I do believe in it," he said, and after a pause he continued sombrely, "but I also know that western minds can create situations in which even we may be forced to shoot—and we must be prepared for that too. If the language of guns is the only language the western world can understand, we too may have to learn to speak it."*

Soon we arrived at the first village. A delegation of the principal citizens of the village headed by their local chief greeted us. There were introductions, Indian salutations, western hand-shakes—all in a spirit of dignity and gravity. We were then led to an open space before the house of the village chief. There, on a large table, stood many rows of earthenware cups and a very large bowl of hard-boiled eggs.

"Don't eat anything if you don't want to," Nehru whispered to me, "but they'd be pleased if you did."

"I love eggs," I said.

Our hosts took nothing. "Why don't they eat too?" I asked. "Eggs are a very great luxury here and they will

* In the crisis of World War II, Nehru was later to write, "I am convinced that the way of non-violence is not merely the only feasible course for us, but is, on its merits, the best and most effective method . . . It is easy to belittle it and point to its failures, but it is far easier to point out the innumerable failures of the method of violence . . . What the future will bring to India is beyond our ken. If that future is still one of armed national forces, it is difficult for us to conceive of a free India without a national army and all the other apparatus for defense." *The Unity of India* (John Day).

probably be saving them for their principal meals for days to come."

Then followed the formal ceremonies which we had come to attend. The whole village had gathered and formed itself into an open semi-circle—all the men, old and young, and all the children, boys and small girls, but no women—Muslim women of the frontier are still in purdah.

First Nehru addressed the villagers, then Abdul Gaffar Khan spoke, followed by the village chieftain. Then the young men came forward. For this was the annual ceremony in which each father of the community pledged the life of his son, as he came of age, to the service of their tribal leader, Abdul Gaffar Khan. He, in turn, pledged them to their nation's leader, Nehru. The five-fold creed of Abdul Gaffar Khan's men was then pronounced :*

1. To be loyal to God, to India, and to their community.
2. To be non-violent.
3. To expect no reward for services.
4. To be prepared for any sacrifice without fear.
5. To live a pure life.

The young men swore their solemn oath of allegiance, and Abdul Gaffar Khan accepted their services in the cause of their nation's freedom.

The most extraordinary thing about the whole extraordinary ceremony was its quietness. Here were these men, in effect laying down their lives, giving themselves over, body and soul, and giving what was more precious than their own lives—the lives of their sons. But there

* See Shridharani's *My India, My America* (Duell, Sloane, and Pearce).

was no fanfare, there was no beating of drums nor raising of voices nor delivery of orations. There was no purple eloquence about blood, tears, toil or sweat. Each man spoke quietly, intently, and tersely. The ceremony lasted a few moments—its significance would last their lifetime.

The gravity and dignity of the welcome was repeated in the farewell. And we drove on to the next village where a similar ceremony took place. In this way, we drove for some five hours through the Afridi areas of the North-west Frontier, stopping at about half a dozen villages.

My presence was briefly explained and casually accepted, and after the formal introduction I was, with the utmost politeness, disregarded—except when occasionally, after the ceremonies, we played for a few moments with the small children who clustered around us. Nehru and Abdul Gaffar Khan were very natural and gay with the children. My love of eggs gradually cooled, but at noon the diet was varied in a big way when a spitted lamb was brought forth in all its delicious smoking glory. We ate with our fingers, and after the meal cleaned them in basins of warm water and linen towels that were brought to us.

Power

Eventually we descended from the mountain passes and, looking down at the plains below, we could see Kohat, the town bordering on Afghanistan where that afternoon Nehru and Abdul Gaffar Khan were to address an open-air meeting. Already, in the distance, we could see a long ribbon-like stream of people making their way to the meeting place. Many thousands had been on their way for days, coming from remote villages.

They lined the roads, tossing garlands, strewing the path with flowers, and shouting, "Jawaharlal, ki jai!"

Abdul Gaffar Khan, ki jai ! In quilab Zindabad ! Long live Jawaharlal ! Long live Abdul Gaffar Khan ! Long live the Revolution !"

What was unique about this vast crowd was the quality of its relationship to the men it was cheering, which was immediately evident to any observer. These two men were not merely politicians—they were political leaders to be sure—but beyond that, they were the friend, the brother, the father, the hero of the nation, the personification of the nation itself, in one. They were not demagogues playing upon the emotions of people for their personal power. They were democrats leading their people out of bondage into freedom.

Abdul Gaffar Khan, long familiar in these regions, relinquished the honors to Nehru, whom many of them were seeing as their national leader for the first time. He stood up in the car as it made its slow way through the peopled roads, and gravely returned their tumultuous salute—surveying them with a certain mixture of pride, love, anguish and resolution.

And there took place then something of that secret fluid intercourse between a great mass of people and its leader—an exchange of strengths and an act of union. The masses gained in dignity and stature by the quality of their leader—and he gained in power and vitality by their faith and confidence in him.

Visibly, the blue Indian air radiated power, vibrated vitality as their great cry "Jawaharlal, ki jai !" echoed and re-echoed throughout Kohat, throughout India, throughout Asia, round the world. It might even have been heard at the India Office in London if they were listening there, but they were not listening.

While the mass meeting was still going on, I slipped off, as had been prearranged, to return to Peshawar and take my train back to Delhi.

But as I drove back to Peshawar, I recalled two other mass meetings we had attended in India—one with the Prime Minister of a Princes' State, and the other with the British Commissioner in a so-called British District. I thought of these crowds and how vastly they had differed.

Riot of the Ryots in Mysore

In the Princes' State of Mysore, the meeting which began as a merely formal ceremony, nearly broke up in a riot as the peasants (called "ryots"), to the utter astonishment and fury of the Prime Minister, made demands, first one, then another, until a dangerous surge spread through the whole mass of people. Only by hastily improvising vague explanations and agreeing to all the concessions demanded, was the dangerous half-hour passed over. The officials looked dark, the crowds triumphant, but the story did not end that day—and has not ended yet.

A few weeks after that meeting, a group of these same peasants attempted to raise a Congress National flag in their native state—and 34 of them were shot and killed—by orders from above.

But the fight for national unity in the native states goes on, and nobody who has seen these people in the presence of their rulers can doubt the outcome of that struggle.

Raj on Duty

To see a British Commissioner, qua commissioner, in the midst of his Indian subjects is an experience like none other anywhere on earth. Now this British Commissioner was a good man, the salt of the earth. To him the white man's burden was no hypocrisy, no cynicism: it was a cross, and he bore it. He had come out to India as a

lad, had spent his whole life amongst these people, learning their language and their customs, and ruling them as the Empire had taught him to rule. He lived a lonely life in a bleak house amongst a strange people and did his duty by the English Crown.

The occasion of this meeting was the dedication of a building, actually a small wooden hut donated by a local Indian to be used as a sort of dispensary. The crowd was small—only the members of a single village. The platform on which we sat bore banners with strange English devices. I remember one: "God helps those who help themselves." This was supposed to have agricultural, not political, significance. The Commissioner spoke carefully in the native tongue with an English accent. The Indians all listened curiously, but distantly, as to someone who would always remain a stranger.

"Why are you here?" their dark, kind eyes seemed to say. "Why do you waste your life with us, who do not want you or need you? Why don't you live at home, strange Englishman?" They would never understand how his duty to the British Crown and his responsibility to the British Empire had any connection with them, the Indian people of India . . .

We walked through the village—one of the 70,000 villages of India—and glanced into some of the mud huts in which most of the 390 million Indians live after a few centuries of the incomparable British administration. The Commissioner was planning to have a new road built through the village. One peasant said he wanted the road extended to his own house, pointing to the wet mud puddles under foot. The Commissioner pretended to give assurances, and the peasant pretended to accept them, but obviously neither believed the other.

The Commissioner said, wearily, "It never occurs to them that they might do something for themselves. One

of our countrymen would drain his own private path, but here they expect Government to do everything for them."

Later a local Indian who knew English interpreted the peasant's point of view to me: "The peasant says, 'Of course, I could repair my own road, but why should I when I pay all my taxes to the British Raj? When the British Raj is gone—then I will repair my own road.'"

One felt here so keenly that one almost saw the wall, the blank but impenetrable wall, between the ruler and the ruled—the mutual frustration, and the total waste. Between the Indian people and their English rulers: the wall that could not be sealed but had to be broken. Between the Indian people and their Indian rulers: the hard but normal national struggle. But between the Indian people and their own chosen leaders: the mutual faith, the unity, and the power. One had only to sense the complete difference in the attitudes of the Indian people on these three different occasions to realize that only with their own leaders—and surely with their own leaders—would they achieve their national destiny.

"What Do We Want? Proof . . ."

That is how we saw Nehru in India six years ago, a symbol of India's fight for freedom. He is still that symbol today. John Gunther wrote in *Inside Asia* that the first political question of that continent was, "What of Nehru?" Today that question is re-echoing on all continents. To all verbal protestations of faith in the democratic creed, comes the recurring response, "But what of Nehru?"

The question is as impersonal as the man himself. It means, not what of Nehru's personal fate, but what of democracy? what of empire? what of a nation of 390 million human beings still held in feudal bondage in the fifth year of the second world war for freedom? what of

the Four Freedoms? what of Any Freedom, not in words, but in Deeds?

The mere release of Nehru himself, or his thousands of fellow-patriots, from imprisonment is no longer a sufficient answer. The basic issue must be squarely met: does freedom for the whole world mean freedom for India too, or does it mean freedom for everybody except India?

Nehru speaks for the east in the language of the west: "What do we want? Proof that this war is for freedom and democracy, and to put an end to imperialism . . . No bargaining. No talk about unessentials and subsidiary matters. India wants to be declared an independent nation. Only on that basis can she discuss or talk . . . We want independence—and not dominion or any other status . . . We want to be completely free with no reservations except such as we ourselves approve, in common with others in order to create a Federation of Nations, or a new world order."

And he has addressed himself to America in American terms: "If the American people, in the words of President Roosevelt, are going 'to keep ablaze the flames of human liberty, reason, democracy, and fair play,' *they will have to throw their weight on the side of liberty and democracy in other parts of the world also*, so that, out of present-day chaos and violence, real peace and freedom may emerge . . . Freedom, like peace, is indivisible, and there will be no enduring equilibrium unless it spans the world."

Nehru and India—the terms have become synonymous—have made an important and original contribution to modern politics. They do what they say, and they say what they think, and they think morally. They have brought into international relations that element of honor, of single not double dealing, of using words to convey what is meant honestly and fully without equivocation or quibbling, semantic morality as well as social and political

morality, which have been so conspicuously lacking in our western world of fairly moral men and completely immoral societies.

Silence

That day in August, 1942, when Nehru was to speak to America for the first time by radio, the British again imprisoned him—this time, incommunicado, silenced . . .

But his silence is heard like an incessant thunder—or like a still small voice—borne by sound waves round the earth. Number Ten Downing Street does not hear it. But the people hear it. They hear his silence. Clearly.

Guns

Revolution for freedom by the spinning wheels of friendship, or by the machine guns of war: responsibility for the outcome is the responsibility of England.

Nehru speaks for India. He speaks for Asia. He speaks for the New World Order. He speaks—but he cannot act. Empire forbids. Empire frustrates. Empire imprisons.

Does Nehru in prison sometimes recall the guns of the Northwest Frontier? Congress is still bound by the steel discipline of non-violence. But there are guns everywhere in India today—real guns that shoot.

If the language of guns is the only language the Empire can understand, may India too have to learn to speak it?

APPENDIX A

Lend-Lease in India

A reincarnated India is emerging out of World War II, aided by American Lend-Lease—a modernized, mechanized, fighting India.

Inexhaustible arsenal of democracy of the East, India has been pouring her men, money, and materials into the cause of the United Nations since the first day of the war.

All elements in India's highly varied life are playing their war roles in their fashion—from her unskilled masses to her research scientists, and from her mechanized fighting forces to non-violent Gandhi himself.

World War II has opened up new horizons for India. She is doing things she has never done before in her five thousand years of history.

Over half the size of the United States, India has three times as many people. She has long been a raw-materials source of supply for British industries. Most of her 390 million people live in her 700,000 villages. Only 16 cities have populations over a quarter-million; two, Bombay and Calcutta, are over a million. Although enormously rich in essential natural resources, such as iron ore, coal, manganese, and hydro-electric power, the country was, until recently, largely undeveloped industrially.

World War I gave India her first industrial impetus, and since 1939, Hitler and Hirohito have become the unwitting instruments of India's second era of modernization. For by virtue of her strategic location, manpower, and resources, India has become the central supply depot

for the military needs of all the United Nations forces in the Middle East, the Far East, and Africa. In the first year of World War II, India's production surpassed that of her total output for the four years of World War I. Her war orders by September 1942 totalled over one and a quarter billion dollars. For 1943, they were expected to reach a new high.

American Lend-Lease has already sent over 300 million dollars' worth of materials to India, with increasing shipments in machine tools to expand India's own war-time productive capacity.

India takes to machinery naturally and gladly—when she can get it. But meanwhile, in certain fields, her un-mechanized labor has been very successfully delivering the goods.

The United Nations depend almost entirely on India for three strategic war materials: mica, lac, and jute. Not western machinery, but her own unskilled workers, make India the world's No. 1 producer of these vital necessities.

"Strategic purpose" mica must be tissue-thin and stainless. It is used for high voltage insulation in radio tubes, spark plugs, and magneto condensers for planes, tanks, and ships. It is a 20th century war essential, for which we are largely dependent on the pre-feudal "aboriginals" of Bihar. About a quarter-million of them mine and split the strategic mica that furnishes 80 per cent of our war needs. These primitive workers split mica sheets by hand, with ancient soft-iron sickles, to a perfect fineness that no industrial machine has yet equalled. Many of them live in mud-huts, wear loin cloths, can't read or write—but they help our most highly mechanized bombers to fly.*

Lac is another Indian monopoly product of strategic importance, the output of which we owe to India's archaic

* It has even been suggested that skilled Indian supervisors be sent to the U. S. to train mica splitters here.

labor. It is used in munitions (as protective coating for shell casings), gramophone records, and photographic materials. The hand labor of Indian workers converts the lac resin secretion on trees, through innumerable hand processes, to the shellac of commerce.

Take jute. Jute makes the bags that carry the food (flour, grain, sugar, salt, corn) that feed the men that fight the war. Jute transports cotton, wool, nitrates, and cement. That good old war perennial, the sand bag, travels in jute. Here too, India's unskilled labor plays its part, for no machinery has yet been invented which can take the place of hand labor in separating the jute fibers from their sticky, bast layer encasings.

India is the sole source of the world's supply of jute, with an average annual production of 9 million bales. Jute products, such as gunny sacks, burlap, cordage, etc., are manufactured in Calcutta's 110 jute mills by her 250,000 mill workers, putting in a 60-hour week.

India's ubiquitous sacred cows, meandering absent-mindedly through all her narrow village and city streets, have long been just a picturesque spectacle to foreign tourists. Nevertheless, these funny, skinny cows have made India the world's No. 1 producer of live stock—and the largest producer of boots and shoes in the British Empire. There are over 200 million cattle in India, one-third of the world total, three times as many as in the United States. India is also the world's largest producer of goat and kid skins, and the third largest, after Australia and the United States, of sheep skins. From native live stock and indigenous tanneries and factories, India is now producing well over 4 million pairs of army boots per year for World War II.

India leads the world in the production of sugar cane and tea, and ties with China in rice. Her output of cotton and tobacco is second only to that of the United States

and of manganese ore, second only to Russia's. Her production of wheat equals that of Canada, and after Argentina and Russia, she is the third largest producer of linseed.

India is the second largest producer of iron ore in the British Empire, second only to Britain itself. Her reserves of iron ore are said to be the largest in the world, and superior in quality to that of any other country. The production of iron ore, pig iron and steel has increased by over 30 per cent since the war.

Her vast hydroelectric potential awaits post-war development as a long-range industrial operation. Electric power is now used in cities and industries, but not yet in the villages. Like pre-Soviet Russia, India needs electrification. Meanwhile, Lend-Lease is sending equipment to expand existing generator power to fill urgent war needs.

India is full of contrasts and paradoxes. On one side, we see her masses of primitive laborers. On another, we find great Indian scientists, like the Nobel prize-winning physicist, Prof. Raman, and great Indian research laboratories, industrial, agricultural, and technological, as well as institutes of applied chemistry, applied physics, and engineering. So it is startling but not altogether unexpected to learn that the greatest steel works in the British Empire are now located, not in Britain, but in India. The Tata Iron and Steel Works at Jamshedpur, near Calcutta, are Indian-owned. Tata maintains research laboratories, a technical training school, and extensive repair and machine tool shops.

Tata began operating iron-smelting furnaces shortly before World War I. From 1913 to 1919, Tata's finished steel production rose from 19,000 tons to 124,000 tons, a six-fold increase. From 1919 to 1939, there was a seven-fold increase up to 867,000 tons. Tata was one of the principal factors that make India the eighth industrial

country of the world—although her production still equalled only one-sixth of Japan's.

The pressure of World War II will probably double Tata's output in 1943. For the first time in its history, Tata is rolling out heavy steel armor plate. New alloy steels required by the Royal Air Force, as well as high-carbon and high-speed tool steels, are also being produced for the first time.

Tata turns out about 75 per cent of India's total steel production. There are three other steel companies: the Steel Corporation of Bengal, the Mysore Iron and Steel Works, and the Government Metal and Steel Factory at Ishapore, which produces only special high quality steel for armaments.

According to official British sources in India, many types of munitions, whose production was never before permitted in India, are now being turned out in large quantities: shells, fuses, and cartridge cases for 3·7 inch anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, mine and depth charges, bombs, grenades, and fire-control instruments. New factories have been established for the production of alloy steels and forgings for guns and gun carriages, guns, rifles, bayonets, light machine guns, field howitzers, small arms ammunition, and high explosives (including a new type of cordite developed by Tata research scientists which eliminates the use of imported ingredients). Except for simple rifles and guns, none of this sort of modern war material was produced in India before. The six pre-war ordnance factories have been expanded, and additional factories are already in operation.

The Indian army's pre-war equipment of 5,000 motor vehicles has been multiplied many times. India's first armoured vehicle was produced in India in 1941. The new assembly of armored cars, tanks, lorries, and field artillery tractors, has been stepped up to the rate of several

hundreds per month. This may not seem much to Detroit, but it is terrific for New Delhi.

General Motors and Ford own and operate plants for the assembly of motor vehicles, under contract with the government. General Motors has one large plant in Bombay, Ford has three smaller ones in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Parts are shipped from Canada.

The war has intensified the demand for Indian minerals. India has supplied over one million tons of coal to the Middle East. Tungsten, now difficult to obtain from China, is being turned out in the form of ferro-tungsten, made from Indian wolfram ore. In addition to mica and manganese ore, India is also increasing her considerable output of chromite, magnesite, ilmenite, bauxite, graphite, vanadium, titanium, aluminum, ferro-silicon, ferro-chrome, to meet war demands. The great timber resources of north India are being tapped for military bridges, huts, machine gun boxes, etc.

World War II brought the tin can into the village kitchens of India—but not for long. After the fall of Singapore, and the loss of Malayan tin, the cans disappeared almost as suddenly as they had come. Dehydrated foods then made their first appearance in the form of individual briquettes. Dried fish, meat, vegetables, fruits, and eggs are now being prepared.

Chemical industries have likewise received a notable impetus from World War II. Some years ago, Tata formed an affiliate, Tata Chemicals, Ltd., as an Indian rival to the British firm of Imperial Chemicals of India, Ltd., the well-known I.C.I. There are other chemical firms at Calcutta, Mysore, and Baroda. Between them, they have begun the production of sodium chloride and magnesium products, synthetic ammonia, bichromates, and other chemicals formerly imported from abroad. Now being produced for the first time in India are toluene and potassium perchlorate

for explosives, strontium carbonate for pyrotechnics, oleic acid for the lubrication of small arms, and dimethylglyoxine for the detection of gas.

Before the war, India had to import about 75 per cent of her medical requirements. Today, she is not only largely supplying herself and the Allied armies of the East, but has also supplied even Russia with approximately 80,000 instruments of indigenous production. About 300 various drugs, formerly imported, are now made in India, and about 5 million medical instruments and appliances are planned for production this year. Over 300 field medical units, equipped in India, are now distributed throughout the Allied armies in the Middle East.

But it is in the textile industry that India's giant war strides are most vividly seen. In 1914, about 60 per cent of India's total consumption of cotton piece goods was imported. In 1940, 7½ per cent was imported. Today, none is imported. India wears all-Indian textiles. And not only is India clothing its own 390 million people, but it is also providing clothing for the Indian army and United Nations forces in the East. Many of these troops are now wearing Indian cloth on their backs, walking on Indian leather, and sleeping in Indian tents under Indian blankets.

The largest industry in India, textiles are manufactured in 390 mills, with 10 million spindles, and 200,000 looms ; employing 450,000 workers. The annual output of cotton textiles is about 7 billion yards, which is sufficient for both civilian and military needs.

About 15 million dollars' worth of army blankets and 36 million dollars' worth of army tents are already in use. Ten million military garments are now being produced per month.

Textile war supplies up to 1942 amounted to \$360,000,000. War supplies up to 1943 are expected to total \$570,000,000.

India notoriously suffers from lack of large-scale tool machinery, and mechanically skilled labor. Less than 2 per cent of India's population are factory workers. How then is India able to turn out all this material?

The answer lies to a considerable extent in the cottage industries. No less than 25 per cent of the cotton piece goods produced by India are still made on hand-loom. Of the 7 billion yards produced annually, 2 billion yards are hand-loomed. The figures for wool are even more astonishing: 30 mills produced 2½ million blankets last year, but no less than 2 million more were woven by hand. Throughout India, small-scale hand labor is producing the goods.

World War II has come into the Indian villages. Walk through many of them today, and this is what you are likely to see: the village blacksmith forging war tools, the village tailor sewing uniforms, the village cobbler nailing army boots, and the village house-wives and children weaving army cloth and army blankets. The skilled human hands of millions of village workers are making up for India's retarded industrial development.

Oddly enough, it is Gandhi whom we have to thank for all this. In the quarter-century between World Wars I and II, while fervid Indian nationalists urged complete Indian industrialization, and the British Government continued to stress raw materials, Gandhi preached the growth of cottage industries for the villages, as a middle ground between the evils of feudal agriculturalism and modern over-mechanization. What Gandhi preached, India practiced. Much of our United Nations equipment from Indian cottages is the fruit of his teaching. Gandhi, whom many termed a reactionary dreamer, has, in the event, proven to be the practical realist.

Before World War II, there was practically no production of machine tools in India. Now over a hundred firms

are turning out simple machines for munitions production, such as drills, lathes, jigs, and gauges ; also tool grinders, furnaces, blasting equipment, and rolling mills. Of American Lend-Lease equipment sent to India, about one-third consists of machine tools to expand the production of munitions.

The main potential for the production of small-arms munitions has been in the railway workshops. These are attached to the railway trunk lines spread throughout the country, and are in effect the munitions cottage industries. Like the others, they are producing the goods.

India's industrial underdevelopment has been of course a tremendous handicap. For instance, at the outbreak of the war, there were only 77,000 automobiles and 80,000 telephones in all India. (Pre-war U. S. had 3,692,000 cars, and 20,830,000 telephones.) Indian people are doing everything in their power to overcome the handicap by concentrated war effort now.

The skilled labor shortage in a country of 90 per cent illiteracy has naturally been acute. This year, however, 337 training centers are planning to train 50,000 skilled workmen. These centers require the services of 1,650 instructors, who have been difficult to find, so special training classes for instructors under 95 British specialist-instructors have been established.

Small groups of Indian workmen have also been sent to England to work in English factories and learn their methods of production. They are sent in batches of fifty for nine months' training, new batches being selected every three months. They are called the Bevin Boys, after Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labor, who inaugurated the plan. While it has been generally applauded, it has also been criticized as being on too picayune and slow a scale for the urgency and magnitude of the job of winning the war in the East. American industrial observers have found

Indians to possess a high mechanical aptitude, with excellent potentials for skilled labor.

Some Indian industrialists have had as colorful careers as our own. Among outstanding figures are the Parsi Tatas, steel and air lines, the firm now being headed by the grandson of the founder, with Sir Ardeshir Dalal, a former Indian Civil Service man, as chairman of the Board ; Walchan Hiracham, of the Scindia Steamship Company, called the father of the Indian shipping industry ; Ispahani, Muslim exporter of jute and lac ; Seth (Big Man) Dalmia, picturesque self-made man who can hardly read or write, but dominates the cement industry ; and Birla, the well-known textile magnate, supporter of Gandhi and the Congress Nationalist movement. All are expanding their industries to meet the demands of the war.

The British Government of India maintains strict control of all war production, and over the import and export of all strategic materials. No firm may manufacture tool machines without special permission of the government. The government itself operates all the ordnance factories, and rigidly controls the distribution within India of all types of small tools.

The Indian Army under British command, which has had the most adventurous and far-flung experience of any army in modern times, is entering a new phase of its picturesque career. With the aid of American Lend-Lease, it is becoming mechanized. The Chatfield Committee Report of 1939 had recommended an earlier modernization, but Dunkirk, Crete, and the heavy losses of the first two years of the war, diverted materials intended for India to the emergency needs of the Battle of Britain and the defense of the Middle East. In the brief punch-drunk interlude between the fall of Singapore and the Allied recovery, India was practically defenseless, and Japan might have

walked in if she had dared. Fortunately, she didn't dare, and today India has a fairly well-equipped army of about two million men.

Aided by Lend-Lease, the mechanization of the army is proceeding as rapidly as conditions will allow. General G. N. Molesworth, deputy Chief of Staff in India has said that the time, training, and equipment needed for an army of a million today would have put an army of four million in the field in World War I. Today about 25 per cent of the troops are used as technical personnel instead of the 2 per cent used in the last war. Technical training schools, sponsored by the Labor Department, have given instruction to some 30,000 technicians of the military forces. Illiteracy, which is about 90 per cent in the country as a whole, is said to have been reduced to about 20 per cent in the army. Voluntary recruiting is now going on at the rate of about 70,000 per month. All the men taken into the army are not armed, of course ; many are used for behind-the-line duties, and as servants.

Three new officers' training schools have been established at Dehra Dun, Mhow, and Bangalore, where Indian and British cadets are now said to be training together for the first time since the British conquest of India. The average training period is eight months. There were no Indians commissioned as officers before 1921. Today, the top Indian rank is Lieutenant-Colonel, of whom there are now three in the Indian Army, one of them being Major Rajendrasinghi, Military Attache to the Indian Agency General in Washington.

Troops of the Indian Army have taken part in most of the large campaigns of the war. They have fought in Libya, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Abyssinia, and Somaliland, as well as in Hongkong, Malaya, and Burma. Nearly one-half million Indian troops are now serving overseas, many in North Africa.

India has long been air-minded. Wealthy Indians fly their private planes. Two air transport companies cover the country, the Tata line flying three routes north and south from Bombay to Karachi, Delhi, and Colombo, and the Indian National Airways flying cross-country from Karachi to Calcutta. For various reasons, however, it was not until 1941 that the first made-in-India airplane had its test flight. Americans will be glad to know that this model, a Harlow trainer, was designed in America, and assembled in an Indian factory in Mysore with American cooperation. Shortly thereafter, however, the factory was taken over by the British Government of India, and its program "modified and tapered off in such a way as to give absolute priority to servicing," although gliders are still being produced. The factory employs about 30 American supervisors and 3,400 trained Indian workmen. It services and repairs both British and U. S. planes.

The most important air development in India is the chain of airdromes constructed by the United States Air Corps and the Royal Air Force along the Burmese border extending into the Himalayan foot-hills, and protecting the air-transport lines into the Chinese interior. Nearly a million men have been employed in building them. It is from these airdromes that the United Nations airfleets must take off for the recapture of Burma, the freeing of China, and the attack on Japan.

When you fly to India from the West, you land at the airport of Karachi, which looks as American as LaGuardia airport on Long Island. Greatly expanded from a civil to a military airport by Indians under American supervision, Karachi is one of the dozens of great landing fields that the United States has set up or rebuilt all over Asia and Africa—great white steel and cement trademarks of American modernity imprinted on ancient cities, forests, and jungles.

The Indian Air Force had only one squadron until the fall of 1941, when a second was added. Today it consists of seven squadrons. Recently, No. 1 Squadron was re-equipped with new aircraft from England, paid for by contributions from the people of Bombay, and is now called the Bombay Squadron. Its motto is: "Itchad men shakti hai," meaning in unity there is strength. The Indian Air Force has made important reconnaissance and bombing expeditions over Burma and Thailand, for which it was twice congratulated by Field Marshal Wavell. Independent flights of the Indian Air Force protect merchant shipping on India's long exposed coast line, cooperating with anti-submarine patrols in the protection of convoys. The Indian Air Force performs important "watch and ward" duties, and is now entrusted with the "policing" of the Northwest Frontier. An Observer Corps covers the country for air raid warnings. Indian pilots are also engaged in ferry transport services throughout the various war zones of the Middle East.

A parachute unit was established in 1942, and favorable weather conditions have made India a training place for British as well as Indian paratroops. Incidentally, India is manufacturing large quantities of silk and cotton parachutes, container-parachutes for dropping equipment, and man-dropping statichutes. Raw silk is reeled in Kashmir from Iranian cocoons, and manufactured in the silk mills of Mysore, Punjab, and Bengal.

Training courses for the Indian Air Force include: operational training units, administrative and special-duties courses, a signals school, courses in mechanical transport driving, parachute-packing and fire-fighting. Air crews and mechanics are trained at the English Training Center, two elementary Flying Training Schools, and the School of Technical Training. The technical school at

Ambala trains technicians, electricians, wireless operators, etc.

A civil aviation training scheme has been designed to turn out 300 pilots and 2,000 ground staff per year for two years. The Indian Air Force is said by the British Government of India to be open to any Indian with the requisite qualifications.

(However, no Indian known to be a member of the Indian National Congress is allowed by the British Government to enter the army. Congress members, as we have seen, constitute 45 per cent of the electorate, the most progressive and forceful element of the nation.)

Since the Japanese took the naval base at Singapore, new shipyards have been humming busily, not only in Britain, Australia, and the United States, but even in India. The largest shipyards are at Calcutta, Bombay, and Karachi, where they are building ships for anti-submarine and patrol duty, escort torpedo boats, and mine-sweepers. By the end of 1942, launchings of these new boats were taking place at the rate of two per month. In addition, over 4,000 merchant ships of the Allied navies have been repaired or refitted in Indian shipyards since the war. American Lend-Lease has sent equipment to enable the shipyards to carry out extensive repair work.

The personnel of the Royal Indian Navy has been increased to ten times its pre-war strength. Formerly, naval recruits were trained in England, but now extensive training courses are held in India, including seamanship, gunnery, signals, navigation, anti-submarine work, and protection against gas attacks. The naval training schools are at Risalpur, Lahore, Ambala, Begumpet, and Jodhpur (the last two in Princes' States). There is also a torpedo school, and a Junior Boys' Naval School at Karachi.

Plans have been laid for a new anti-submarine school to

be established by officers of the British and Indian Royal Navies, in which training will be given not only to Indians, but to personnel from all the Allied countries. This school is expected to become the largest in the Empire, next to that in England.

The sloops and launches of the Royal Indian Navy have taken part in the defense of Singapore, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies, and in the campaigns of East Africa against the Italians, and in Iran. Throughout Eastern waters, they carry on their duties of escort, patrol, and mine sweeping.

The naval defense of India rests primarily with a powerful new British naval force, built around three first-line battleships and an aircraft carrier, recently assembled in Indian waters.

Women have been given an important part to play in the volunteer services. Some have come out of the seclusion of purdah to take part in 20th century war. Many others are modern experts in laboratory research, driving cars, and flying planes. They are in great demand as nurses. There is a shortage of trained nurses, with only one to 55,000 of population. It seems that Indian soldiers used to have a prejudice against women nurses, but in the upheaval of World War II, it is fast disappearing. Women doctors and dentists are also attached to a few medical units. Elaborate plans for civilian defense in the event of air raids or invasion have also been developed.

The contributions of the Indian Princes' States to the war effort have been commensurate with their importance. They include outright gifts of large sums of money, and the raising of fifty-six units for all branches of the service, army, navy, and air. The maharajahs of Mysore, Hyderabad, and Baroda have been especially active. Some of the younger princes, Cooch-Behr, Jaipur, and Jodhpur, have

contributed their private airplanes. Certain Indian States Forces (I.S.F.) have replaced the Indian Army in policing the Northwest Frontier.

The British war expenditure in India for 1942-43 was about \$1,164 millions, used for industrialization, mechanization of army, war supplies. This sum was part of the British (not Indian) budget, payable by the British taxpayer.

The budget of the Government of India allotted \$716 millions for defense in 1942-43, and \$600 millions for defense in 1943-4.

War-time planning for India by Indians began in 1938 with the All-India Congress National Planning Committee, consisting of Hindus, Muslims, and representatives of Princes' States, under the chairmanship of Jawaharlal Nehru. The Nehru Report, foreseeing the war, emphasized the urgent necessity for large-scale industrialization, continued development of cottage industries, and the expansion of major industries for military defense. Some of the far-sighted recommendations of this monumental Report are now gradually being put into effect under the stimulus of war—although its creators have been imprisoned.

Lord Linlithgow, then Viceroy of India, inaugurated the Eastern Group Supply Council in the fall of 1940, in an attempt to pool war supply resources for the Middle and Far East. Since this proved inadequate to the needs of global war after the fall of Singapore, the Viceroy, in April 1942, invited the United States Government to send American experts to India to advise on coordination of war production.

The American Technical Mission, which was headed by Henry F. Grady of the State Department, and included H. E. Beyster, Dirk Dekker, and A. W. Herrington, with Dr. Frank A. Waring as Executive Officer, made an in-

tensive two-months' study of India's war production capacities and potentialities. In August 1942, the Mission submitted its secret Report—said to be cast in the same broad mold as the Nehru Report—with specific recommendations for the expansion and rationalization of industry, mass production methods, training of skilled labor, and utilization of resources. It is on this Report that American Lend-Lease to India is based.

Under Lend-Lease, America has sent India about 300 million dollars' worth of war materials, especially armored tanks, steel, and tool machines, and various supplies to expand her manufacturing, farming, mining, and shipping facilities to meet our war needs. Also such apparently small but essential things as electric bulbs to keep her factories going twenty-four hours a day.

In return under Lend-Lease, India is giving our troops airports, housing, equipment, tents, blankets, hot-weather uniforms, food, and munitions, and is repairing and servicing our planes, tanks and ships. She is doing as much for all the other United Nations troops in India, British, Dominion, and Chinese. This reciprocal aid is estimated at \$50 millions for 1942-43, and \$36 millions for 1943-44.

U. S. Army troops in India are a form of Lend-Lease aid in more ways than one. Indians had anticipated their arrival with a certain reserve, but our soldiers made friends there as they have done everywhere else. The casual camaraderie of the American troops, their good-humor, sympathy, and direct democratic approach have proved an invaluable asset in bridging the gap between East and West in India.

It is no secret that American engineering experts have been appalled at India's industrial underdevelopment, retarded by what Brailsford calls the "negative control" of the Government which prohibits Indians from developing their own resources. To this day Indians are for-

bidden to produce modern locomotives in India : this symbol of industrial potency must remain British. The lack of locomotives has slowed up the war effort, slowed up the reopening of the Burma Road, slowed up the war in the East—and increased the deaths by famine in Bengal. (The government has promised to appoint a commission to study the matter . . .)

Impressive as India's war effort already is, most Indians and many British feel that it could be greatly augmented by the establishment of a national Indian government. While many millions are taking part in the war, many others are not, especially the political prisoners. If these national and local leaders, the best brains of the country, were also mobilized inside the war effort, instead of being immobilized outside, then India's energy and output could be immeasurably expanded. Political discontent, aggravated by inadequate planning and serious famines, seriously impede the war effort. Many observers believe that a politically responsible India, producing at maximum, could lift a major portion of our own war burdens, and appreciably shorten the war. All agree that the coming Battle for Asia will be launched from India.

Meanwhile, in their fashion, all elements in India are doing their part to win the war : the mica-cutters of Bihar and the research scientists of Tata Steel, the cottage weavers and the factory workers, the peasants and the princes, the women and the children. And even the imprisoned revolutionaries like Gandhi and Nehru, by their unswerving allegiance to the United Nations cause of freedom for all, have incalculably aided India's gigantic contribution to our common fight for victory.

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